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Equity in the Bureaucracy 
 
Daniel E. Ho* 
Many governments have proposed “equity initiatives.” Seattle-King 
County’s Equity and Social Justice initiative, for instance, calls for 
applying an “equity lens” to policy analysis and for “all county employees 
to advance equity through their daily work.” How should such initiatives 
be understood and implemented in bureaucratic decisions? This Essay 
argues that equity dimensions of regulatory enforcement are pervasive,  
if unrecognized. Based on collaborative work with the food-safety 
program of the largest health department in Washington State (Public 
Health–Seattle and King County), I use large-scale inspection 
microdata, merged with census and social media information, to 
illustrate three such dimensions. First, as an empirical matter, equity 
considerations pervade the exercise of discretion by the many frontline 
employees who implement an agency’s policies. When it comes to 
enforcement—including equity considerations—an agency is a “they,” 
not an “it.” Second, I demonstrate that recent proposals for food-safety 
agencies to use big data to target inspections would have considerable 
distributive implications, shifting public enforcement resources away from 
minority and immigrant areas and importing the digital divide into 
regulatory enforcement. Third, information disclosure in the form  
of restaurant letter grading presents complex equity trade-offs. 
Conventional letter grading ignores differences in inspection stringency, 
resulting in dramatic geographic differences solely due to the identity of 
the inspector. I demonstrate how to design a more accurate and consistent 
grading system, but I also show that this system can magnify differences 
across cuisines. These case studies demonstrate both the profound 
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challenge and opportunity presented by data-driven approaches in giving 
content to “equity initiatives” in the bureaucracy. 
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On a cloudy Saturday in August, University of Washington attorney James 
Buder and elementary school teacher Deanna Buder took their four-year-old 
daughter, known to most as Scout, to a farmers market east of Seattle. They shared 
a plate of pork carnitas tacos from Chilangos, a food truck and catering business 
selling at seven local farmers markets under the direction of Mexico City–born chef 
Oscar Mendez. Several days later, Scout developed severe stomach cramps, fever, 
and diarrhea. The symptoms worsened, and two weeks later, the Buders rushed 
Scout to the Seattle Children’s Hospital, where she was diagnosed with E. coli.1 
Scout experienced kidney failure and was placed in the intensive care unit (ICU), 
receiving blood transfusions and dialysis. Said Deanna, “We couldn’t pinpoint it 
because we hadn’t eaten beef, and that’s what you think of when you think of  
E. coli.”2 
When Scout was hospitalized, the health department (Public Health–Seattle 
and King County) investigated. Interviews with thirteen individuals infected with  
 
1. See Complaint for Personal Injury and Damages at 5, Buder v. Mendez Bros., No. 15-2-
25355-7 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2015); Tom Corrigan, County Still on Track of E. Coli Outbreaks 
Linked to Local Farmers’ Markets, ISSAQUAH PRESS, Sept. 10, 2015, at 1. 
2. Tina Patel, 6 Sickened by E. Coli Linked to Local Food Vendor at Farmers Markets, Q13 FOX 
NEWS (Sept. 1, 2015, 9:58 PM), http://q13fox.com/2015/09/01/health-officials-say-e-coli-outbreak-
linked-to-vendor-at-farmers-market [https://perma.cc/6ZPW-BMD5]. 
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E. coli revealed they had all eaten at Chilangos.3 The department issued a cease and 
desist order to Chilangos and shut down its shared “commissary kitchen,” used by 
eleven other vendors to prepare food.4 As the news broke, the local CBS broadcast 
reported the story with the headline, “E. coli cases linked to food sold at farmers 
markets,” along with pictures shared over social media of Scout in the ICU.5 
Commentary speculating about the outbreak was relentless. Some blamed it on 
culture: “This is not a race issue, but a cultural one. In some cultures, to see a fly or 
cockroach in the kitchen is ‘no big deal’ and food handling safety is not a top 
priority.”6 Others assailed local food: “This is the problem with farmers market 
food. It can never get traced back, all evidence is long gone and no one is ever held 
accountable.”7 And the Buders themselves denounced not just Chilangos, but also 
county officials for lax enforcement and maintenance of food-safety standards.8 
While suspicion initially fell on meat, further investigation focused on cilantro, but 
the ultimate source could not be identified. County officials worked with vendors 
to provide additional food-safety training to all affected staff, and Chilangos 
reopened roughly a month later.9 
Fortunately, after three weeks of hospitalization, Scout recovered. 
Represented by Marler Clark, a leading foodborne illness litigation firm that sued 
Jack in the Box in 1993, the Buders have filed suit against Chilangos, asserting strict 
product liability and negligence claims.10 
Scout’s tragic story highlights profound issues in food-safety regulation and 
enforcement in a highly fragmented and decentralized system. Each year, some 48 
million Americans become sick from foodborne illness, 128,000 are hospitalized, 
and 3000 die.11 Particularly vulnerable populations include children, the elderly, 
pregnant women, and immunocompromised patients.12 Roughly 60% of 
 
3. See Lindsay Bosslet, Public Health Investigates E. Coli Outbreak, PUB. HEALTH INSIDER 
(Sept. 1, 2015), http://publichealthinsider.com/2015/09/01/public-health-investigates-e-coli/ 
[https://perma.cc/X75W-DXL2]. 
4. Id. 
5. Health Investigators: E. Coli Cases Linked to Food Sold at Farmers Markets, KIRO 7 (Sept. 1, 
2015, 3:54 PM), http://www.kiro7.com/news/e-coli-case-being-investigated-king-county/
27086005 [https://perma.cc/R87N-LTPD]. 
6. Kristin Morgan, Comment to Update: 9 Confirmed, 1 Probable Case in Seattle E. Coli 
Outbreak, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Sept. 4, 2015) [hereinafter 9 Confirmed in Seattle E. Coli Outbreak], 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/09/6-e-coli-cases-linked-to-mexican-food-sold-at-
washington-farmers-markets/ [https://perma.cc/39YE-K9EZ]. 
7. Megan, Comment to 9 Confirmed in Seattle E. Coli Outbreak, supra note 6. 
8. See Patel, supra note 2; Cathy Siegner, 9 Confirmed in Seattle E. Coli Outbreak, supra note 6. 
9. Bosslet, supra note 3. 
10. See Complaint for Personal Injury and Damages, supra note 1. 
11. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United 
States, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden [https://
perma.cc/E7M8-E45D] (last updated Aug. 19, 2016). 
12. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Foodborne Illness: Especially Dangerous for the Vulnerable,  
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [FDA], http://www.fda.gov/
ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm354783.htm [https://perma.cc/QUH7-GK9U] (last 
updated Sept. 20, 2016). 
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documented outbreaks came from restaurants,13 and securing regulatory 
compliance with these establishments is the purview of states, counties, and 
municipalities. 
Many of these jurisdictions have proposed so-called “equity initiatives,” calling 
for agencies to take action to reduce inequities and to promote social justice.14 In 
King County, all executive agencies are charged to apply an “equity lens” to policy 
initiatives and to “establish systems to engage and empower all county employees 
to advance equity through their daily work.”15 Yet what does equity mean in the 
bureaucratic context? When and how should line-level food-safety officials 
“advance equity” in the inspection process? How can administrative agencies apply 
an “equity lens” in implementing the health code to preserve cultural differences 
associated with food while protecting the public at large? How should food-safety 
officials accurately and equitably disclose information about food-safety risks? And 
what distributive implications does media or social media have on the deployment 
of public resources? 
This Essay argues, based on inspection data from the largest health 
department in Washington State (Public Health–Seattle and King County), that 
 
13. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, New CDC Data on Foodborne Disease 
Outbreaks, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cdc.gov/features/foodborne-
diseases-data [https://perma.cc/JU9H-9BES] (last updated May 27, 2015). 
14. Of the twenty largest counties in the United States, eight counties (apart from King County) 
have established initiatives to promote equity and/or social justice. See, e.g., News Release, Miami-Dade 
Cty, Board of County Commissioners Passes Legislation Requiring Social Equity Statements on  
All New Ordinances, (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.miamidade.gov/district08/releases/2015-09-01-
social-equity-statements-on-all-new-ordinances.asp (requiring social equity statements for ordinances); 
County Equity Oversight Panel, BD. OF SUPERVISORS, CTY. OF L.A., http://bos.lacounty.gov/
About-Us/Executive-Office-of-the-Board/County-Equity-Oversight-Panel [https://perma.cc/
TD2Y-YBM9] (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (describing equity oversight panel); Chronic Disease and  
Health Equity (CDHE) Unit, SAN DIEGO HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. AGENCY, http://
www.sandiegocounty.gov/content/sdc/hhsa/programs/phs/chronic_disease_health_disparities.html 
[https://perma.cc/CE2A-WBGK] (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (discussing responsibility of unit  
to promote “wellness and prevention of illness, disability, and premature death from chronic disease  
by increasing health equity”); Center for Health Equity, N.Y. DEP’T HEALTH & MENTAL 
HYGIENE, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/health/neighborhood-health/center-for-health-
equity.page [https://perma.cc/44MJ-XRJH] (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (discussing mission to 
“strengthen and amplify the Health Department’s work to eliminate health inequities, which are rooted 
in historical and contemporary injustices and discrimination, including racism”); Health Equity, HARRIS 
CTY. PUB. HEALTH, http://publichealth.harriscountytx.gov/Resources/Health-Data/Health-Equity 
[https://perma.cc/C9U6-WFGB] (last visited Mar. 3, 2016) (discussing initiative to strengthen the 
“health equity capacity of [its] workforce” and to promote policies with a “health equity lens”); 
Human Relations Commission, CTY. OF SANTA CLARA, https://www.sccgov.org/sites/ohr/
human%20relations%20commission/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HBJ-THKH] (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2016) (discussing Human Relations Commission’s responsibility to “advise the Board of 
Supervisors on issues that affect the human and civil rights of all County residents and advocate for 
and take positive action to eliminate prejudice and discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, 
cultural background, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability or other factors”). 
15. KING CTY. EXEC., ACO 9-2 (AEO), ADVANCING EQUITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGIC INNOVATION PRIORITY PLAN AND EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENT ACTIONS (2014). 
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equity dimensions of regulatory enforcement are pervasive, if unrecognized. Part I 
demonstrates that individual inspectors exhibit wide variability in enforcement 
styles, including on equity grounds. Many qualitative reports suggest that 
jurisdictions with large immigrant populations encounter difficulties in food-safety 
enforcement in “ethnic” establishments due to linguistic, cultural, and food 
preparation differences.16 Consistent with these reports, I show empirically that 
differences in individual inspection styles can be broken down into two distinct 
dimensions. First, inspectors vary generally in their stringency of code enforcement. 
Second, inspectors vary—independent of general stringency—in their stringency 
specific to ethnic establishments, specifically Asian restaurants in King County. 
These two dimensions combine to generate the most inspection uncertainty for 
Asian establishments across different inspectors. I then provide suggestive evidence 
from a randomized controlled trial showing that peer review has the potential to 
reduce differences in how Asian establishments are inspected.17 
The Essay then considers two policies often advanced by New Governance 
approaches18: first, improving regulatory performance by risk targeting of 
enforcement resources, and second, disclosure based on letter grading of 
establishments.19 Although these approaches are seductive and intuitively appealing, 
I show that their distributive implications can be complex and their health 
consequences nonobvious. 
Part II argues that agencies should be cautious about targeting, the idea that 
enforcement resources should be increasingly targeted toward high-risk 
establishments. A particularly novel and widely reported idea is to use social media, 
such as Yelp reviews or Twitter feeds, to target inspections. One widely cited 
 
16. See, e.g., Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming 
dismissal of challenge to California’s “Shark Fin Law”); Kimberly J. Harris et al., Food Safety Inspections 
Results: A Comparison of Ethnic-Operated Restaurants to Non-Ethnic-Operated Restaurants, 46 INT’L  
J. OF HOSPITALITY MGMT. 190 (2015); Jee Hye Lee et al., Popular Ethnic Foods in the United States: A 
Historical and Safety Perspective, 13 COMPREHENSIVE REV. FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 2 (2014); 
Alison Rudder, Food Safety and the Risk Assessment of Ethnic Minority Food Retail Business, 17 FOOD 
CONTROL 189 (2006); Stephanie K. Baer, Peking Duck Is So Important to Chinese Culture It Got a 
Health Code Exception: Here’s Why, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (Aug. 22, 2015), http://
www.sgvtribune.com/health/20150822/peking-duck-is-so-important-to-chinese-culture-it-got-a-
health-code-exception-heres-why [https://perma.cc/SLK8-8PMW] ; Eveline Chao, The Roast Duck 
Bureaucracy, OPEN CITY (Mar. 11, 2014), http://opencitymag.com/the-roast-duck-bureaucracy/ 
[https://perma.cc/JVR7-XFCM]; Lillian G. Po et al., Food Safety Education for Ethnic Audiences, 
FOOD SAFETY ( June/July 2011), http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/magazine-archive1/
junejuly-2011/food-safety-education-for-ethnic-audiences/ [https://perma.cc/G3A9-F6FM]. 
17. The full results of the peer review randomized controlled trial are reported in Daniel  
E. Ho, An Experiment of Experimentalism: Does Peer Review Work?, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
18. Although varied, “New Governance” theories depart from traditional command-and-
control models in favor of decentralized, collaborative, and performance-based solutions. Such 
approaches, for instance, favor information disclosure over bans and decentralized learning over 
hierarchical control. See Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1, 2–3 (Gráinne de Búrca 
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006). 
19. Id. 
Final to Printer_Ho (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  2:19 PM 
406 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:401 
algorithm, for instance, uses descriptions like “Mexican” and “Vietnamese” that 
would pose serious questions under antidiscrimination law.20 Moreover, I show 
empirically that because social media use is highly skewed along demographic lines, 
such targeting would shift enforcement resources away from areas that are more 
heavily populated by minorities, immigrants, and the less educated. These findings 
inform longstanding concerns about the digital governance divide and equity 
implications of regulatory use of big data.21 
Part III examines the distributive implications of restaurant grading, which has 
been hailed as the poster child for information disclosure.22 By converting numerical 
inspection scores into letter grades of A, B, and C, and posting these in entryways, 
many argue that regulators can nudge consumers to act as if fully informed and to 
incentivize operators to improve safety practices. But grading, as conventionally 
practiced, fails to take into account the core challenge of vast differences in 
inspection styles among frontline inspectors.23 I present collaborative work with 
King County to design a more accurate, equitable, and meaningful grading system. 
Adjusting for inter-inspector differences across neighborhoods can improve 
accuracy and consistency and mitigate differences solely due to the identity of the 
inspector. On the other hand, such adjustments magnify differences between Asian 
and non-Asian restaurants, showing that reducing inequity along one dimension 
(neighborhoods) can heighten concerns along another. 
Part IV discusses how equity considerations might better be addressed. Our 
research suggests that peer review and data-driven training can help resolve difficult 
equity questions with greater care and consistency. While data-driven efforts to 
increase the reporting rate are promising, the more important efforts involve 
training frontline inspectors and educating food staff in principles of food science, 
which can be aided by performance data, as well as peer review, but cannot be 
sidestepped by algorithm or grade. King County has taken bold and commendable 
steps in hiring multilingual staff and providing materials in multiple languages from 
which other counties should learn, but there remains considerable room for 
 
20. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (2013). 
21. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-
data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UJN5-H7QC]; John Clayton Thomas & Gregory Streib, The New Face of Government, Citizen-Initiated 
Contacts in the Era of E-Government, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 83, 98–99 (2003) (finding 
that users of government websites are “better educated, more likely to be white, wealthier, and younger 
than Internet users in general”); Kay Lehman Scholzman et al., Weapon of the Strong? Participatory 
Inequality and the Internet, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 487, 489–490, 503 (2010) (finding strong associations 
between socioeconomic status and most measures of Internet-based political engagement); Michael  
J. Magro, A Review of Social Media Use in E-Government, 2 ADMIN. SCI. 148, 155 (2012) (“The digital 
divide is a major barrier to e-participation.”). 
22. See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS 
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 82–83 (2007); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure 
of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 743–48 (2011). 
23. See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 
YALE L.J. 574, 592 (2012). 
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improvement regarding language access. The Essay concludes by noting that 
quantitative research can help to concretize otherwise diffuse notions of “equity” 
and that rigorous evaluation of equity initiatives can promote more effective 
deployment of public resources. 
I. FOOD SAFETY AND EQUITY ON THE FRONTLINE 
The frontline of the food-safety system consists of local health inspectors who 
exhibit considerable variability in experience, expertise, and discretion. While much 
of administrative law and regulatory theory considers agencies to be monolithic, this 
Part makes one core point: equity dimensions of regulatory enforcement play out 
through the discretionary decisions of numerous frontline employees. In this sense, 
an agency is a “they,” not an “it.”24 
Section I.A provides background on King County and the contentious 
question of how food-safety inspections engage with Asian establishments. Some 
of the most disputed elements are the role of culture, language, and the engagement 
of immigrant communities with the law. Section I.B analyzes nearly 60,000 
inspections from 2007–2014, matched with establishment information from Yelp, 
to empirically demonstrate that inspectors vary along two critical dimensions: 
general stringency and stringency specific to Asian establishments. Section I.C then 
turns to the information from the peer review to show that while such differences 
still materialize under a peer review intervention, they are less pronounced. The 
intervention suggests that peer review can help a department grapple with tough 
issues surrounding how to inspect Asian establishments. 
If an agency is a “they,” peer review promotes acting more like an “it.” 
A. Background 
As depicted in Figure 1, King County is a fast-growing area with a substantial 
immigrant population, due in part to the county’s historical openness to refugees.25 
From 1990 to 2011, the county’s population grew by 29%, with nearly 60% of the 
population growth coming from immigration, roughly half from Southeast Asia.26 
Asians comprise the largest minority group in the county, constituting roughly 16% 
of the population, with roughly 48% of those foreign-born.27 Of individuals 
 
24. With apologies to Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent 
as an Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
25. Elizabeth Rhodes, New Immigrants Changing Look of Life in Seattle, SEATTLE TIMES  
(Oct. 10, 1993), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19931010&slug= 
1725371 [https://perma.cc/46XP-TLT6]. 
26. CHANDLER FELT, KING CTY. COUNCIL, KING COUNTY’S CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS: 
A VIEW OF OUR INCREASING DIVERSITY, 11–12 (2013), http://www.kingcounty.gov/~/media/
exec/PSB/documents/AGR/KingCountyDemographics2012.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/
F3MM-C6T6]. 
27. See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: King County, Washington, U.S. DEP’T 
COMM., http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/53033,00 [https://perma.cc/GL7E-
CWW8] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
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speaking an Asian language at home, 43% have limited English proficiency.28 The 
restaurant sector is, if anything, even more diverse. By one estimate, roughly 20% 
of the 11,500 permitted food establishments serve Asian cuisines,29 35% of 
restaurant workers were born abroad, and 29% of food preparation workers have 
limited English proficiency.30 As the Seattle Times reported, immigrants “who lack 
English end up working within their ethnic communities—in restaurants, small 
groceries and the like.”31 
 
28. U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder: King County, Washington, U.S. DEP’T COMM., 
http://factfinder.census.gov/ [https://perma.cc/HDV7-C69J] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016) (search 
“Advanced Search” for “King County, Washington;” then follow ID “S0505,” then “Selected 
Characteristics of the Foreign-Born Population by Region of Birth: Asia, 2010–02014 American 
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates” hyperlink). 
29. This is based on all establishments that could be matched from Yelp to King County 
establishment data. See infra note 38. 
30. 35% (+/- 1.5%) and 29% (+/- 1.4%) statistics calculated using 2010–02014 American 
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) data. PUMS data obtained 
from U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder: ACS Public Use Microdata Samples, U.S. DEP’T COM., 
http://factfinder.census.gov/ (search “Advanced Search” for “Public Use Microdata Sample;” select 
“2010-2014 ACS 5-year Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) – CSV format,” and download 
“Washington Population Records”) (last visited July 11, 2016). Estimates were calculated by selecting 
Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) in King County, accounting for code differences between 2011 
and 2012. We used Standardized Occupation Codes within the data to identify entries corresponding 
to restaurant workers: we defined a restaurant worker as a chef, head cook, “first-line supervisor of 
food preparation and serving worker,” cook, “combined food preparation and serving worker 
(including fast food),” waiter, waitress, dishwasher, host (restaurant, lounge, and coffee shop), or 
hostess (restaurant, lounge, and coffee shop). We defined “food preparation worker” as all of the above, 
with the exception of host, hostess, waiter, waitress, and dishwasher. We used the “Nativity” field in 
the PUMS data to identify people born overseas, and we used the “Ability to speak English” field to 
identify those who speak English less than very well. In order to calculate estimates and standard errors, 
we used the methodology outlines in the “ReadMe” accompanying the PUMS data. See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2010–2014 ACS 5-YEAR PUMS FILES README ( J an. 21, 
2016), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech_docs/pums/ACS2010_2014_PUMS_ 
README.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY3J-VVP3]. We used “Person’s Weight” and “Person’s 
Weight replicate” fields to calculate the number of restaurant workers satisfying the criteria expressed 
above, and to calculate the total number of restaurant workers in King County. 
31. Rhodes, supra note 25. 
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Figure 1: King County Population Density (2015). The bottom left insert plots counties in 
Washington State, with the gray box indicating the area of King County displayed in the main 
panel. King County displays census tracts, with darker shading corresponding to higher 
population density (broken into quintiles). 
 
Restaurant inspections are conducted by the food-safety program in the Public 
Health Department (Seattle and King County). The program has fifty-five staff 
members, including thirty-four frontline inspectors assigned to inspect specific areas.32 
These areas are based primarily on ZIP codes and are switched in an “area rotation” 
once every few years. The typical full-service restaurant receives two routine inspections 
and one educational inspection per year.33 Fifty violations are classified either as critical 
(red) or noncritical (blue) violations.34 In a routine inspection, an inspector determines 
 
32. See PUB. HEALTH – SEATTLE & KING CTY., KING COUNTY FOOD PROTECTION 
PROGRAM REVIEW: FINAL REPORT 1 (2014); Common Questions About Food Safety, PUB. HEALTH—
SEATTLE & KING CTY, http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/ehs/foodsafety/
foodfaq.aspx [https://perma.cc/B5NQ-8GFU] (last updated Mar. 18, 2013). 
33. Conventional full-service restaurants are typically classified as “risk III” establishments. 
Risk I and II establishments have more limited food preparation and are therefore subject to fewer 
inspections per year. See Permanent Food Risk Based Inspection Program, PUB. HEALTH—SEATTLE & 
KING CTY, http://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/health/environmental-health/food-safety/food-
business-permit/risk-levels-permit-classifications.aspx [https://perma.cc/KX7U-25AQ] (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2016). 
34.  See Food Establishment Inspection Report Form, PUB. HEALTH—SEATTLE & KING CTY., 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/ehs/foodsafety/inspections/~/media/health/
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whether to cite each of these violations, and each violation is assigned a fixed number 
of points, from two to twenty-five points.35 County policies provide that thirty-five red 
points require a return visit within thirty days, and ninety red points result in immediate 
closure.36 A food-safety training class is required of all workers.37 
The food-safety program also conducts foodborne illness investigations based 
largely on reports of infections.38 The county maintains a dedicated phone line staffed 
by a public health nurse to conduct a thorough intake process, recording all sources for 
meals, symptoms, and related facts.39 As is well known in food science, public 
perceptions of foodborne illness are often misguided, and this intake process helps to 
focus departmental resources on well-founded claims. For instance, callers often present 
with symptoms that are inconsistent with claims about a particular establishment: e.g., 
eating at a restaurant and getting sick two hours later. During King County’s Chipotle 
E. coli outbreak in 2014, the intake nurse received some 150 calls, but of these calls, 
fewer than fifteen presented with symptoms consistent with E. coli.40 
For years, inspectors have struggled with how to accurately and consistently 
implement the health code, with tensions particularly acute with respect to Asian 
establishments. As part of King County’s Equity and Social Justice initiative, the food-
safety program engaged in substantial hiring efforts to diversify the cultural and 
linguistic backgrounds of inspectors.41 Roughly 22% of the staff speaks a foreign 
language, covering Mandarin, Cantonese, Vietnamese, Korean, Cambodian, Tagalog, 
Amharic, Japanese, and Punjabi.42 Some inspectors have tried on a limited basis to use 
translation services. For instance, one inspector noted on the inspection report that he 
“[r]eviewed [the] inspection report with translator, daughter of owner, on the 
telephone.” Another reported “[f ]ac[ing] difficulty communicating with the operator. 
Will do an educational visit with Vietnamese interpreter to go over proper food safety 
process.” Food Worker Manuals are available in English, Cambodian, Chinese, Korean, 
Punjabi, Russian, Spanish, Tagalog, Thai, and Vietnamese.43 
 
publichealth/documents/foodsafety/inspectionform.ashx [https://perma.cc/985E-U7MV] (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
35.  Two violations are disaggregated based on severity, so our analysis at the violation-level 
examines fifty-two violations. See id. 
36.  See Common Questions About Food Safety, supra note 32. 
37.  Id. 
38. See Foodborne Illness Complaints, PUB. HEALTH—SEATTLE & KING CTY., http://
www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/communicable/diseases/FoodBorneIllness.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/32RE-EZZY] (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). 
39. See How to Report Possible Foodborne Illness, PUB. HEALTH—SEATTLE & KING CTY.,  
http://www.kingcounty.gov/healthservices/health/ehs/foodsafety/inspections/illness.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3BVL-M4RV] (last visited Sept. 10, 2016). 
40. Telephone Interview with Becky Elias, Pub. Health—Seattle and King Cty. (Feb. 7, 2016). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. See Food Worker Manual, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.doh.wa.gov/
CommunityandEnvironment/Food/FoodWorkerandIndustry/FoodWorkerManual [https://
perma.cc/BY6A-V838] (last visited September 26, 2016). 
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As a sign of staff tension, a local television news broadcast in 2013 reported on 
allegations that the department was “go[ing] easy” on Asian restaurants.44 One inspector 
appeared as an anonymous whistleblower, accusing the department of “turning a blind 
eye” to ethnic restaurants.45 In 2006, another sued for wrongful termination purportedly 
after “refusing to go easy on ethnic restaurants.”46 The suit was settled for $125,000.47 
Another former inspector claimed, “If we close down too many Asian restaurants, then 
it’s going to start looking like we are singling them out and discriminating against 
them.”48 At the same time, the news report also noted that nearly 80% of restaurants 
with the highest number of health violations serve Asian food.49 The Director of Public 
Health’s response: “All restaurants, ethnic restaurants and other restaurants, have to 
follow the same high standard.”50 Others believe that rigid code application can 
systematically disadvantage certain ethnic cuisines with distinct food preparation 
techniques. As one commentator wrote, “Restaurant regulation is a complicated issue, 
especially when concerning restaurants run by immigrants to the country, people who 
were raised eating food prepared and treated differently.”51 
Tensions in bureaucratic equity are by no means unique to King County. In New 
York, major misunderstandings between restaurant inspectors and restaurateurs, for 
instance, have surrounded the application of the code to Chinese roast duck,52 Korean 
kimchi,53 and Japanese sushi rice.54 
Because the department does not itself retain cuisine information, we merged 
information from Yelp, based on a record linkage algorithm using name similarity, 
 
44. Whistleblower: Health Inspectors Turning Blind Eye to Ethnic Restaurants (KIRO 7 television 








51. Editorial: Restaurant Scrutiny Good, But Don’t Jump to Conclusions, NORTHWEST ASIAN 
WEEKLY., June 1–7, 2013, http://www.nwasianweekly.com/2013/05/editorial-restaurant-scrutiny-
good-but-dont-jump-to-conclusions/ [https://perma.cc/PN9K-WL6P]. 
52. See Chao, supra note 16 (describing history of citations of roast ducks when one food science 
writer opined, “[t]he fact of the matter is that they cook the crap out of it, the skin is dry, they baste it 
when it’s up on the thing so there’s very little water activity, and the stuff underneath has been killed 
pretty good”). 
53. Sumathi Reddy, Restaurants Sour on Rules Over Kimchi, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2011),  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204879004577108632273070376 [https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20170105204944/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020487900
4577108632273070376] (describing enforcement of cold holding temperatures against kimchi, despite 
acidity level, and quoting one restaurateur as saying, “[the inspectors] don’t understand the kimchi”). 
54. Jill Colvin, Restaurant Owners Skewer Health Department Grading System, DNAINFO  
(Mar. 7, 2012, 7:29 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20120307/manhattan/restaurant-
owners-skewer-health-department-grading-system [https://web.archive.org/web/20170105205040/ 
https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20120307/manhattan/restaurant-owners-skewer-health-
department-grading-system] (reporting that the owner of Sushi Yasuda “received three different 
answers from three different inspectors about rules overseeing sushi rice”). 
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phone number, and geocoded addresses.55 Figure 2 provides descriptive statistics of the 
relative performance across cuisines types. Each dot represents the average number of 
critical (red) violation points, with the dashed line representing the county average for 
the first routine inspection in 2014. It becomes immediately apparent that Asian cuisines 
(e.g., Indian, Japanese, Chinese, Thai, and Vietnamese) fare worse than Western 
cuisines. There is no evidence, on the other hand, for the cultural claim made in the 
context of the Chilangos outbreak. Establishments serving Mexican food perform the 
same as the average King County restaurant. 
 
 
Figure 2: Average number of critical (red) violation points by cuisine type. Each dot represents a 
(nonexclusive) cuisine classification according to Yelp, weighted by the number of 
establishments. Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dashed vertical line 
represents the average number of red violations. These statistics are calculated for the first routine 
inspection for an establishment in the 2014 calendar year. Only cuisine types with at least twenty 
establishments are presented. 
 
These descriptive statistics might of course stem from underlying differences in 
food-safety practices across establishment types, so to understand how individual 
inspectors grapple with these cuisine differences, we turn to more comprehensive data. 
 
55. We collected information for 12,025 establishments from Yelp. This list was intentionally 
overinclusive, including, for instance, drug stores, gas stations, and wineries. To cast the search as widely 
as possible, we utilized multiple search strings (e.g., “Food,” “Restaurants,” “General Food”) across all 
cities and neighborhoods in King County. In order to merge the Yelp establishment information with 
King County’s data, we regularized names and addresses in Yelp and King County data and geocoded 
addresses to augment and validate county GIS information, using ArcGIS and Google’s API. Our 
matching algorithm matches exactly based on ZIP code, phone number, and similarity of addresses and 
establishment names. Out of 11,568 establishments to be inspected in 2014, we identify matches for 
53% of establishments, a higher rate than that of Jun Seok Kang et al., Where Not to Eat? Improving 
Public Policy by Predicting Hygiene Inspections Using Online Reviews, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 
CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL METHODS OF NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING (EMNLP) 1443 (2013). 
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B. Inspection Data 
We study data from 58,594 routine inspections conducted by thirty-four frontline 
inspectors at 4930 high-risk restaurants for which cuisine classifications could be 
matched from Yelp from 2007–2014. 
We hypothesize that equity considerations can affect the exercise of discretion in 
two ways. First, the primary effect may be on the general stringency level of inspections. 
Consider an analogous university setting with no enforced grade curve. Equity 
considerations may lead some instructors to grade leniently across the board. The 
observable implication is that inspectors most concerned with equity considerations 
might inspect all establishments more leniently. Second, due to cultural and linguistic 
factors, inspectors may differ in stringency specifically with regard to Asian 
establishments.56 For instance, in the case of an Asian establishment with a large number 
of potential violations, one inspector might cite only the most critical violations, given 
the potential language difficulties of conveying remedial measures. Another inspector, 
however, might decide simply to write up all of the violations, on the assumption that 
only a return visit or closure will generate compliance. In psychometric terms, we might 
refer to this propensity by some inspectors who are otherwise similarly stringent to 
inspect Asian establishments differently as “differential item functioning” (DIF).57 
The left panel of Figure 3 examines to what extent the raw difference for Asian 
establishments exists across inspectors. Each gray dot represents the scores awarded by 
an individual inspector to non-Asian establishments on the x-axis and those awarded to 
Asian establishments on the y-axis. The difference is stark. Nearly every inspector 
assigns worse inspection scores to Asian establishments, strongly suggesting that the 
performance difference reflects underlying food-safety practices. The inspector 
differences, however, are not homogeneous. Some inspectors fall in the lower left 
corner and are more lenient overall, thereby also generating smaller absolute differences 
between Asian and non-Asian establishments. Amongst stricter inspectors, scoring at 
least ten points, there are dramatic differences in the relative performance of Asian to 
non-Asian establishments, suggesting the presence of DIF. 
The middle panel of Figure 3 provides some intuition of such DIF in practice for 
one inspector. The x-axis presents the average score that peers assigned to an 
establishment and the y-axis presents how that inspector scored the same establishment. 
Each dot represents an establishment, weighted by the number of peers who have 
inspected it, with red indicating an Asian establishment. This panel shows two trends. 
 
56. Although there are of course distinct Asian cuisines and communities, as well as deviations 
between cuisine and ethnicity of operators, to make the analysis tractable, we use the term “Asian 
establishment” to refer to establishments denoted by Yelp to serve Asian cuisines. These are primarily 
comprised of categories displayed in red in Figure 2, but also include smaller categories of cuisine (i.e., 
Asian Fusion, Hot Pot, Indonesian, Malaysian, Mongolian, Ramen, Shanghainese, Szechuan, Himalayan 
Nepalese, Laotian, Pakistani, and Singaporean). 
57. In the educational testing context, DIF refers to the fact that some test items function 
differently for test takers of equal ability. Here, Asian establishments may function differently for 
inspectors of otherwise equal stringency. See generally DIFFERENTIAL ITEM FUNCTIONING (Paul  
W. Holland & Howard Wainer eds., 1993). 
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First, the inspector generally appears to be more stringent than peers, assigning an 
average of 13.8 red points compared to 11.5 red points by peers, even though these are 
for the same establishments ( p-value = 0.01). Second, stringency appears to uniquely 
affect Asian establishments: the fitted red line is uniformly higher for Asian 
establishments, compared to the gray line for non-Asian establishments. (If there were 
no inspector differences at all, the lines would fall on the forty-five-degree line.) Note 
that this is not simply an artifact of Asian establishments generally faring worse: if that 




Figure 3: The left panel plots inspector average red points for non-Asian establishments on x-axis 
and Asian establishments on y-axis, with dots weighted by the number of Asian establishments. 
The middle panel presents how one inspector’s scores compared to inspections of the same 
establishments by peers. Asian establishments receive higher violation scores, holding constant 
how other inspectors inspected those establishments. The right panel presents parameter 
estimates for stringency on the x-axis and Asian DIF on the y-axis, showing that inspectors appear 
distinct on these two dimensions. For establishments with identical inspection histories, Asian 
DIF represents the additional points that the specific inspector would assign to an Asian 
establishment versus a non-Asian establishment. The vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals 
on the DIF parameter. 
 
To characterize this more formally, we fit the following regression: 
E 	  
where Yijt represents the number of red points assigned by inspector i to establishment 
j in year t. The first term on the right-hand side  is an inspector fixed effect 
representing the general stringency of each inspector. The second term  is an 
establishment fixed effect, which controls for time-invariant, establishment-specific 
differences in food-safety practices. This term is primarily identified off of area rotations 
(and vacations, which lead some inspectors to conduct inspections outside of their home 
area) and accounts as well for general food-safety differences across Asian and non-
Asian establishments. Because we control for establishment-specific attributes, the third 
term represents the DIF estimate for each inspector ( ), where Aj is an indicator for 
whether establishment j serves Asian food. The last term  is a year fixed effect, to 
account for general changes over years. We estimate the above equation with ordinary 
least squares, with the least stringent inspector as the baseline category, clustering 
standard errors at the employee level. 
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The right panel of Figure 3 presents estimates of general stringency on the x-axis 
and Asian DIF on the y-axis. Each dot represents the relative stringency and Asian DIF 
of an inspector.58 These estimates suggest that there are indeed two distinct dimensions 
that characterize frontline inspectors. Some inspectors, for instance, are lenient 
generally, but relatively strict on Asian establishments. One inspector, who speaks 
Cantonese and Mandarin, falls in the midrange of general stringency, scoring roughly 
eight points on average for non-Asian establishments, but assigns thirty-five additional 
points to Asian establishments. Some inspectors in the bottom right part of the panel 
are generally tough but relatively lenient toward Asian establishments compared to their 
peers. The vertical (95% confidence) intervals are statistically distinct across different 
inspectors, suggesting that Asian DIF is unlikely due to chance alone. (We can reject the 
null hypotheses that (a) inspector effects jointly, or (b) DIF effects jointly are equal to 
zero.59) 
It is important to note that there is no obvious “right answer” to code 
enforcement based on what we observe. Inspectors who inspect Asian establishments 
more stringently, for instance, could be biased against such establishments. But it is 
equally possible that these inspectors exhibit no bias, and that inspectors who inspect 
Asian establishments more leniently exhibit favoritism toward such establishments. Nor 
is it obvious a priori whether more stringent enforcement against Asian establishments 
is beneficial toward minority communities. Enforcement actions can negatively affect a 
business (e.g., via a requirement to install a new refrigerator), but can also protect its 
patrons. Absent more information (e.g., on customers, employment), one cannot 
determine whether a higher level of code enforcement would be beneficial to the Asian 
community per se. 
 
 
58. These coefficient estimates are all relative to one baseline inspector, who, for ease of 
interpretation, is lenient in both dimensions. 
59. The model explains roughly 32% of the variation in inspection outcomes based on R2. 
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Figure 4: Consistency of inspections across inspection cycles before an area rotation (top panels) 
and after an area rotation (bottom panels). Each panel depicts the number of red points for an 
establishment (censored at twenty-five red points) across years. 
 
Figure 4 shows how these two dimensions interact in practice. The top two panels 
present how the same establishment performs over two calendar years in routine 
inspections conducted by the same inspector (prior to an area rotation). Each dot 
represents an establishment (randomly jittered for visibility) and the blue bands present 
linear fits, with 95% confidence bands, for the correlation over cycles. The slope is 
positive, indicating that a higher score in 2012 is associated, albeit weakly, with a higher 
score in 2013. The degree of association is captured by the regression coefficient β, 
which indicates that a ten-point increase in 2012 is associated with a three-point increase 
in 2013. The association is essentially identical for Asian establishments presented in the 
top right panel. Roughly 8–9% (R2) of the variation in 2013 is explained by prior 
performance. 
The bottom panels display what happens after an area rotation occurs in 2014 and 
a new inspector is assigned to these establishments. Comparing the strength of 
association after an area rotation provides us a sense of how differences in individual 
inspection styles affect the predictability of scores. For non-Asian establishments in the 
bottom left panel, the association decreases but is still statistically significantly 
positive—a ten-point increase in 2013 is associated with a roughly two-point increase 
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in 2014. The bottom right panel shows that this attenuation is far more severe for Asian 
establishments, so much so that there is no longer a statistically significant correlation 
across inspection cycles. Because differences in general stringency and Asian DIF 
interact in the bottom right panel, an area rotation leads to the greatest uncertainty for 
Asian establishments.60 
This observational evidence corroborates the qualitative evidence that inspectors 
operationalize the food code and equity concerns quite differently, with unique 
consequences for Asian establishments. 
C. Peer Review 
In 2015, we collaboratively designed a randomized controlled trial of peer review 
within the health department. For sixteen weeks, we randomly assigned half of the 
inspection staff to engage in joint inspections one day a week, during which they 
observed identical conditions on the ground, but independently scored health code 
violations for the establishment. Our general results are reported elsewhere,61 but we 
focus here on how peer review might inform equity considerations, such as linguistic, 
cultural, and socioeconomic differences in establishments. 
 
 
Figure 5: Correlation across pairs of peers during peer review inspections. Asian establishments 
generally score on the higher end of the range and as a result generate more opportunities for 
disagreement. Regressing Peer 2 scores against Peer 1 scores, an Asian establishment indicator, 
and an Asian interaction with Peer 1, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the correlation 
between peers is identical across cuisine type (R2 = 0.85). 
 
 
60. We found no evidence that stringency and DIF are correlated with the language skills of the 
inspector. 
61. See Becky Elias & Daniel E. Ho, Government Under Review: Could Peer Review for Public 
Servants Make the Law More Consistent?, BOS. REV. ( June 27, 2016), https://bostonreview.net/
editors-picks-us-books-ideas/daniel-e-ho-becky-elias-government-under-review [https://perma.cc/
QK9C-NFAD]; Ho, supra note 17. 
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Figure 5 presents evidence of the correlation across peers visiting the same 
establishment. We see that the correlation is quite high for both non-Asian and Asian 
cuisines (R2 = 0.85), even though inspectors disagreed about specific health code 
citations nearly 60% of the time.62 While Asian establishments receive higher scores, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the correlation between peers is the same for either 
set of establishments. This suggests that Asian DIF is moderated in peer review. This 
result stands in contrast to the result in independent inspections, which appeared to 
exhibit greater inter-inspector inconsistency for Asian establishments (compare the 
bottom right panel of Figure 4). These results together suggest that peer review may be 
particularly useful for improving the consistency of inspections for high-scoring Asian 
establishments. 
To understand how peer review might alleviate Asian DIF, we can examine 
comments submitted in a weekly survey of the peer review team, some of which 
mention the particular language difficulties encountered during joint visits. For instance, 
inspectors typically select comments on violations based on a drop-down field in a 
computer tablet. One inspector noted that while her “peer wanted to use the canned 
comments[,] I wanted to use my own comments because the people were English as a 
second language folks [and] I could use easier words for them to understand.”63 
Another language difficulty encountered was between the manager and staff of an 
establishment. One inspector reported, “The operator also asked me to provide her with 
Spanish language because her staff [was] mostly Hispanic food workers. I emailed the 
operator the food worker’s manual [in] Spanish, Thai and in English the same day.”64 
One supervisor who had not been in the field for some time noted, “[N]ot 
understanding a word that was said gave me a greater appreciation of ESL [English as 
a Second Language] difficulties in the field.”65 Another indicated that peer review 
highlighted differences in enforcement, particularly surrounding language: “I learned 
that some of us will write the violation as they see it and some of us are interested in 
preventing foodborne illness by making sure the operator[s] understand food safety. 
The understanding part may require the inspector to spend more time educating the 
food workers using necessary tools (interpreter services, food worker’s manual in their 
own language, video) to achieve the goal.”66 
These accounts from peer inspections demonstrate not only how differences in 
addressing language barriers can generate inconsistency in independent inspections, but 
also how peer review can transmit such skills and ultimately increase consistency in 
handling such issues. 
* * * * 
 
62. In 60% of nearly 400 peer inspections, inspectors disagreed on citing one or more code 
items. 
63. Daniel E. Ho, Peer Review Comments Findings (2011) [hereinafter Peer Review Comments 
Findings] (some results from this source presented in Ho, supra note 17). 
64. Id. 
65. Ho, supra note 17, at 72 (citation omitted). 
66. Peer Review Comments Findings, supra note 63. 
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To sum up, Part I has shown that equity considerations pervade the exercise of 
frontline discretion, a point largely overlooked by regulatory theories and administrative 
law doctrines that often treat an agency as monolithic. In this context, the challenge lies 
less in lack of awareness of equity dimensions, but rather in the sharp differences across 
inspectors regarding how such considerations are implemented on the ground. How 
should inspectors best overcome language barriers? To what extent is a more 
educational approach warranted when there may be cultural differences in food 
preparation? How can inspectors best apply food science to a wider range of food 
preparation techniques that can surface in non-Western cuisines? Answering such 
questions alone is challenging. Peer review, in the words of King County’s equity 
initiative, constitutes a promising “system[ ] to engage and empower [frontline 
inspectors] to advance equity through their daily work.”67 
Parts II and III will show that equity dimensions also unexpectedly affect two 
popular regulatory strategies. We begin with attempts to “target” public resources based 
on big data. 
II. TARGETING 
In 2012, the city of Boston developed an iPhone app called “Street Bump” that 
used the iPhone Accelerometer to detect street bumps for city repair. At first glance, it 
seemed ingenious. Rather than relying on spotty self-reports, Street Bump could 
efficiently trigger service requests, allocating resources where needed most. The first 
version, however, had very high false positive rates (“phantom potholes”68). And 
because iPhone users were not a random sample of the Boston population, the app 
appeared to deploy far more city resources to more affluent areas of Boston.69 While 
such distributive implications can be addressed ex post,70 the Street Bump example is 
instructive. Equity considerations should not be afterthoughts in the deployment of 
public resources. In evaluating current and proposed systems, policymakers should 
proactively identify, assess, and mitigate potential equity problems in the design of 
policies. 
 
67. KING CTY. EXEC., supra note 15, at 3. 
68. Phil Simon, Potholes and Big Data: Crowdsourcing Our Way to Better Government,  
WIRED, http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/03/potholes-big-data-crowdsourcing-way-better-
government/ [https://perma.cc/Z7U2-Q7SH] (last visited Feb. 27, 2016); see Civile, Street Bump—
Useful But Not Ready for Prime Time Engineering, PUB. WORKS GRP. BLOG (Feb. 10, 2013), http://
www.publicworksgroup.com/blog/2013/02/street-bump-review/ [https://perma.cc/CA9E-
56KM]. 
69. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at 
Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion?, at 13 (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_events/313371/bigdata-transcript-9_15_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/V97U-
WMYB]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 27–28. 
70. See Ramirez, supra note 69, at 13 (noting that as a partial remedy, the City of Boston sent its 
own inspectors out with Street Bump apps to cover the city more equitably). 
Final to Printer_Ho (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  2:19 PM 
420 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:401 
A. Promises 
Using data-driven techniques to target discretionary enforcement resources has 
been proposed, discussed, and implemented in many regulatory contexts, including 
criminal enforcement,71 occupational safety and health inspections,72 environmental 
inspections,73 mining safety inspections,74 and consumer safety.75 Outside the 
enforcement policy context, prediction algorithms have been shown to help reduce 
Medicare costs by avoiding futile joint replacements,76 to make bail decisions,77 to target 
youth mentoring interventions,78 to forecast domestic violence calls,79 and to allocate 
community supervision of convicted criminals based on forecasts of the likelihood of 
murder.80 Prior targeting approaches have used the agency’s own data, but a newer 
proposal is to use “big data” from social media to target inspection resources. Such 
approaches have particular appeal in the area of food safety because of limited 
enforcement resources and the well-known difficulties of reporting, detecting, and 
tracing sources of foodborne illness.81 
 
71. See ANTHONY A. BRAGA & DAVID L. WEISBURD, POLICING PROBLEM PLACES:  
CRIME HOT SPOTS AND EFFECTIVE PREVENTION (2010); PRISCILLA HUNT, JESSICA SAUNDERS  
& JOHN S. HOLLYWOOD, RAND CORP., EVALUATION OF THE SHREVEPORT PREDICTIVE  
POLICING EXPERIMENT (2014) (finding no statistically significant differences between treatment  
and control districts); G.O. Mohler et al., Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing,  
110 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 1399 (2015) (finding that model-based predictions outperformed analyst 
predictions). 
72. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in Regulatory 
Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 745 (1997). 
73. See Eric Helland, The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, and Self-
Reporting, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 141 (1998). 
74. See Alison D. Morantz, Mining Mining Data: Bringing Empirical Analysis to Bear on the 
Regulation of Safety and Health in U.S. Mining, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 45, 61 (2008) (discussing theory and 
history of targeted enforcement and arguing for application to mining safety). 
75. See Richard A. Berk, Forecasting Consumer Safety Violations and Violators, in IMPORT 
SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 131 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 
2009). 
76. See Jon Kleinberg et al., Prediction Policy Problems, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 491, 493 (2015) 
(illustrating how mortality forecasts can save Medicare costs on joint replacements). 
77. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL 
RISK ASSESSMENT (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-
research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP7W-94WN]; Shaila Dewan, Judges 
Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2015, at A18. 
78. See Dana Chandler, Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, Predicting and Preventing Shootings 
Among At-Risk Youth, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 288, 288 (2011). 
79. See Richard A. Berk, Yan He & Susan B. Sorenson, Developing a Practical Forecasting Screener 
for Domestic Violence Incidents, 29 EVALUATION REV. 358, 360 (2005). 
80. See Geoffrey C. Barnes et al., Low-Intensity Community Supervision for Low-Risk Offenders: 
A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 159, 186 (2010); Richard Berk et 
al., Forecasting Murder Within a Population of Probationers and Parolees: A High Stakes Application of 
Statistical Learning, 172 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 191, 208 (2009). 
81. According to the CDC, “[s]urveillance statistics [of foodborne illness] reflect a fraction of 
cases that occur in the community. Underdiagnosis and underreporting of foodborne illnesses present 
challenges for surveillance and the detection of outbreaks.” Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Foodborne Illness Surveillance Systems, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2011), http://
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I here review some of the leading work in the food-safety context. 
Chicago’s Cross-Agency Data Project. The city of Chicago conducted a pilot 
project that merged multiple municipal databases to forecast which establishments were 
likely to have critical violations.82 The city tested the algorithm for a two-month period 
in 2014, comparing violations detected in field visits to predicted violations had 
inspections counterfactually been prioritized by the predictive algorithm. Predictors 
included variables internal to the food-safety program, such as the inspector assigned, 
the type of facility, prior critical violations, and length of time since operation and last 
inspection, but also included information outside the food program such as nearby 
garbage and sanitation complaints and burglaries. The retrospective study concluded, 
without reporting statistical significance, that critical violations would, on average, be 
found 7.5 days earlier with the forecasting exercise.83 
Sadilek Twitter Targeting. Adam Sadilek and coauthors studied how Twitter data 
could be used to allocate enforcement resources.84 They downloaded all tweets in Las 
Vegas for a three-month period, associated these tweets with restaurants within fifty 
meters, and collected tweets by these users for the following five days.85 They used 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to recruit humans to answer for a sample of tweets the 
question: “Do you think the author of this tweet has an upset stomach today?”86 Using 
this hand-coded sample as the training dataset, they applied machine-learning 
techniques (support vector machines) to classify all tweets for upset stomachs.87 Top 
predictive terms, for instance, included the words “stomach” and “stomachache.”88 
They then used these predictions to schedule health inspections with restaurants.89 
Working together with the Southern Nevada Health District, they sent inspectors to 
pairs of establishments, one being identified via Twitter and the other used as a 
control.90 Inspectors were not informed which establishment was targeted by the 




82. See Food Inspection Forecasting: Optimizing Inspections with Analytics, CITY OF  
CHI. [hereinafter Food Inspection Forecasting ] , http://chicago.github.io/food-inspections-evaluation/ 
[https://perma.cc/KEP3-LBNQ] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
83. See Julian Spector, Predictive Policing Comes to Restaurants, ATLANTIC ( Jan. 7, 2016),  
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/predictive-policing-food-poisoning/
423126/ [https://perma.cc/P4ZA-8QFA]. 
84. See Adam Sadilek et al., Deploying nEmesis: Preventing Foodborne Illness by Data Mining Social 
Media, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH CONF. ON INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 3982 (2016), http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/IAAI/IAAI16/paper/view/
11823/12317 [https://perma.cc/B8M7-2PW8]. 
85. Id. at 3983. 
86. Id. at 3985. 
87. Id. at 3986. 
88. Id. at 3983 fig.2. 
89. Id. at 3983. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 3985. 
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establishments had nine violation points, compared to six points for control 
establishments.92 
Chicago Twitter Reporting. Chicago deployed Twitter primarily to increase the 
reporting rate of foodborne illnesses in the city.93 In 2013, the city set up a website 
(Foodborne Chicago) for online reporting of foodborne illnesses.94 From March 2013 
to January 2014, the city collected 2241 tweets mentioning the term “food poisoning,” 
which were then reviewed by staff for signs consistent with foodborne illness.95 Two 
hundred seventy of these tweets were deemed genuine reports, resulting in a Twitter 
reply to encourage the individual to report the incident via the website.96 A total of 193 
individuals reported the incident via the web form, resulting in 133 additional 
inspections.97 During the same period, Chicago conducted 1941 complaint-based 
inspections; the rates of detection of critical violations (roughly 92%) were comparable 
across these two samples.98 
New York Yelp Targeting. New York City used Yelp review information to 
increase the reporting rate analogously to Chicago’s use of Twitter. Based on 294,000 
Yelp reviews, the city’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene retrospectively 
searched for food poisoning terms (“sick”, “diarrhea”, “vomit”, and “food poisoning”), 
yielding 893 reviews.99 Epidemiologists manually read the reviews for signs consistent 
with a foodborne illness outbreak, namely whether the incubation period exceeded ten 
hours and whether multiple individuals appeared to be affected.100 This manual review 
yielded 129 individuals, whom the department attempted to contact via Yelp.101 Of 
these, 102 did not consent to be interviewed, but of the twenty-seven who were 
interviewed, three outbreak cases were identified, though there was no laboratory 
confirmation due to the passage of time.102 
Kang Yelp Targeting. Kang et al. scraped and merged data from Yelp with King 
County health inspection data from 2006–2013.103 The dataset covered 1756 restaurants 
and 152,000 reviews.104 Applying machine-learning techniques (support vector 
 
92. Id. at 3987. 
93. See Jenine K. Harris et al., Health Department Use of Social Media to Identify Foodborne 
Illness—Chicago, Illinois, 2013–2014, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 681 (2014); About, 
FOODBORNE CHI. [hereinafter Foodborne Chicago], https://www.foodbornechicago.org/pages/about 
[https://perma.cc/ZJ2Z-Q8AD] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
94. Harris et al., supra note 93, at 681. 




99. See Cassandra Harrison et al., Using Online Reviews by Restaurant Patrons to Identify 
Unreported Cases of Foodborne Illness—New York City, 2012–2013, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REP. 441, 441 (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6320.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5HQS-XRLA]. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 444. 
102. Id. at 443–44. 
103. See Kang et al., supra note 55, at 1444. 
104. Id. 
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machines), they identified review terms and cuisines associated with inspection 
scores.105 For instance, a review mentioning the term “friendly” was associated with 
lower violation scores,106 while the terms “ramen”, “pho”, or “gross” were associated 
with higher violation scores.107 Similarly, German and European cuisines were 
associated with lower violation scores,108 and Vietnamese, Thai, Mexican, Japanese, 
Indian, and Chinese cuisines were associated with higher violation scores.109 Using 
inspection history alone resulted in a classification accuracy rate of 72%, compared to 
81% when using review information.110 
B. Challenges 
While promising, naively adopting the above approaches for food-safety 
inspections poses profound challenges. This subsection discusses these challenges in 
antidiscrimination law, statistical validity, public misperceptions, unarticulated implicit 
normative commitments, and opportunity costs. 
1. Antidiscrimination Law. Some algorithmic approaches are likely to run afoul of 
antidiscrimination law. Kang’s proposal, for instance, to target inspection resources 
away from European establishments toward Vietnamese, Thai, Mexican, Japanese, 
Indian, and Chinese establishments may well violate equal protection, Title VI, and/or 
state law.111 Especially because the algorithm adds only marginal value on top of simply 
using the inspection history alone, using such suspect characteristics is likely a non-
starter for a public agency. 
These questions tie into a broader, and increasingly important, question about 
whether state agencies are allowed to take into account race, national origin, or gender 
in algorithmic decisions,112 a debate that has been most developed in the criminal justice 
 
105. Id. at 1446. 
106. Id. at 1446 tbl.3. 
107. Id. at 1446 tbl.2. 
108. Id. at 1446 tbl.3. 
109. Id. at 1446 tbl.2. 
110. See id. at 1445–47 (determining accuracy by dichotomizing violation scores across a range 
of thresholds and calculating the ability of predictors to classify establishments correctly). 
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(1) (2009) (“The right to be free from discrimination because of race, 
creed, color, national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or 
the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service 
animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.”); Castaneda  
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Blair v. Wash. State Univ., 108 Wash. 2d 558 (1987) (finding state Law 
Against Discrimination to apply to public university’s athletics scholarship program); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 
(2015); Dow Constantine, King County Title VI Policy Statement (May 28, 2010), http://
kingcounty.gov/depts/civil-rights/title-nine.aspx [https://perma.cc/9YTS-SDU8] (“King County 
further assures every effort will be made to ensure nondiscrimination in all of its programs and activities, 
whether those programs and activities are federally funded or not.”). 
112. In the gender context, see, for example, Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity 
& Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (finding that payment of lower retirement 
benefits to women based on actuarial statistics violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); City of Los 
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context.113 For instance, the model by Berk et al. includes race and gender as predictors 
in a forecasting model of murder.114 They argue that formalizing the predictive power 
of race would allow a polity to make an informed determination about the trade-off 
between reduced forecasting accuracy and racial neutrality.115 In other contexts, 
algorithms might reduce bias compared to an alternative decision making system. The 
weight placed on race explicitly in a parole algorithm, for instance, may in fact be lower 
than the weight placed on race implicitly via human clinical assessment.116 In the 
inspection context, however, the vast majority of inspections are routine inspections 
with fixed annual frequencies across all establishments. Relative to that baseline, an 
algorithm that prioritizes Asian establishments for routine inspections cannot possibly 
reduce national origin bias.117 
Even setting aside the highly questionable use of cuisine categories, the use of 
reviews by private individuals in an unstructured setting can raise questions under 
antidiscrimination laws. Kang’s algorithm, for instance, uses highly subjective language 
like “friendly” as a predictor of risk.118 One study has shown that online reviews exhibit 
signs of bias, describing minority neighborhoods in reviews as “dark,” “dangerous,” and 
“sketchy.”119 Predictors that are themselves affected by racial bias—even if not racial 
classifications per se—may pose problems.120 Of course, determining which predictors 
are subject to racial bias is a difficult determination: for instance, if reviewers were more 
 
Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (finding that a municipal agency 
requirement that women make larger contributions to pension funds based on actuarial statistics 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 
113. See, e.g., Jordan M. Hyatt & Richard A. Berk, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform 
Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 227 (2015) (arguing that we do not know whether racial 
bias is more or less pronounced with actuarial vs. clinical judgments in the sentencing context); Anna 
Maria Barry-Jester et al., Should Prison Sentences Be Based on Crimes that Haven’t Been Committed Yet?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT.COM (Aug. 4, 2015, 11:42 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/prison-
reform-risk-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/PA9C-JZPC]. 
114. See Berk et al., supra note 80, fig. 1. 
115. Id. at 201. 
116. Cf. Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and 
Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 563 (2007) (arguing that the extent of the racial preference was empirically 
greater in a discretionary as opposed to quantified preference system). 
117. A more nuanced claim could be made for return inspections, as discretion enters both the 
likelihood of scoring thirty-five or more points and when to return to the establishment. Proposals for 
targeting algorithms, however, have focused only on routine inspections and return inspections 
constitute a small fraction of the full inspection workload. 
118. Kang et al., supra note 55, at tbl.3. 
119. Sharon Zukin et al., The Omnivore’s Neighborhood? Online Restaurant Reviews, Race, and 
Gentrification, J. CONSUMER CULTURE 1 (2015) (comparing reviews from a white-gentrifying and a 
black-gentrifying neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York, and finding that the former is more likely to 
be associated with Europe and the latter with loaded descriptions of the neighborhood). 
120. The Arnold Foundation’s bail algorithm, for instance, uses prior traffic violations,  
which could itself be a function of racial bias. See MARIE VANNOSTRAND & CHRISTOPHER  
T. LOWENKAMP, ARNOLD FOUND., ASSESSING PRETRIAL RISK WITHOUT A DEFENDANT 
INTERVIEW 12 tbl.4 (2013). See also Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race, 27 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 237 (2015) (“[R]isk today has collapsed into prior criminal history, and prior criminal history has 
become a proxy for race.”). 
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likely to call Asian restaurants “gross,” conditional on the same inspection score, this 
result may reflect (anti-Asian) bias from consumers or (pro-Asian) bias from inspectors. 
2. Statistical Validity. While interesting as proofs-of-concept, big data techniques 
tend to gloss over conventional principles of statistical inference and research design, 
which threaten the validity of wide-scale deployment. We highlight here two common 
challenges with causal inference and representativeness. 
(a) Causal Inference. Enthusiasm over big data often glosses over principles of 
causal inference. Big claims are made, but little attention is paid in predictive analytics 
to evaluating the actual impact of the potential intervention. The Chicago Cross-Agency 
Data Project estimated that critical violations could be detected 7.5 days earlier, without 
reporting statistical significance.121 The intervention simultaneously introduced a web 
reporting form with Twitter outreach, and, as a result, it is impossible to disentangle the 
beneficial effects of the Twitter outreach from the effects of a web reporting form. 
Sadilek’s Las Vegas study assesses the potential impact of targeting by providing 
a matched comparison on Twitter-targeted inspections versus control inspections.122 
But even here, inferences are limited. The paired comparisons include only 142 
inspections.123 The number of tweets could simply reflect the number of customers at 
(or close to) the establishment, regardless of safety practices. The matched comparison 
might hence be confounded by the popularity of an establishment. The more food is 
served, the easier it may be for an inspector to cite a violation, and the more patrons an 
establishment has, the higher the absolute risk even if per capita risk is the same, so the 
differences in point scores may be an artifact of differences in popularity. The ultimate 
insight from the Las Vegas study might then be that inspection resources should be 
targeted toward popular restaurants (with Tweets providing one measure of popularity), 
but state agencies hardly need social media to develop a risk-grading system based on 
the frequency of visits or revenue.124 
(b) Representativeness. Public health agencies exist to protect the public at large, 
but social media data are not representative of the population as a whole. Consider 
Kang’s study, which was able to match only 1756 restaurants from Yelp to King 
County’s health inspection database.125 Seattle, the city that Kang focused on, in fact 
 
121. See Food Inspection Forecasting, supra note 82. 
122. See Sadilek et al., supra note 84. 
123. Id. at 3983. 
124. Id. (incorporating seating levels and state income revenue data in a more comprehensive 
fashion to achieve the same aim). 
125. Jun Seok Kang and his colleagues imply that the health department “has only limited 
resources to dispatch inspectors, leaving out a large number of restaurants with unknown hygiene 
grades” and infer that “[m]ore than 50% of the restaurants listed under Yelp did not have inspection 
records, implying the limited coverage of inspections.” Kang et al., supra note 55, at 1443–44. This 
reflects some basic misunderstandings about the inspection system. First, Yelp’s restaurant categories 
do not directly match the jurisdiction of King County’s food program. Nearly all permitted 
establishments are in fact visited by an inspector during the year. In 2014, for instance, 99% of risk III 
establishments received at least one visit. More importantly, matching Yelp entries to inspection data is 
not straightforward, as the names can differ considerably across the two datasets. For instance, the 
restaurant named “Von’s Gustobistro” in Yelp is named “1000 Spirits” in King County’s inspection 
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had over 7789 permitted establishments during that time period.126 Are Yelp reviews 
representative? Sadilek’s study uses exclusively individuals who tweeted within fifty 
meters of a restaurant.127 How representative are those establishments of the population 
of Las Vegas restaurants? Table 2 in the Appendix provides some basic descriptive 
statistics about how comparable Yelp and Twitter users are to the nation. 
Unsurprisingly, social media users are younger, more educated, and wealthier.128 
Figure 6 plots the distribution of the number of reviews across establishments in 
King County. The distribution is highly skewed, with a small number of establishments 
drawing the vast majority of Yelp reviews. Out of some 6000 matched establishments, 
the top 100 establishments account for over 25% of all reviews submitted. The modal 
establishment receives no reviews at all. 
 
 
Figure 6: Distribution of number of Yelp reviews across establishments in King County. Very few 
establishments receive a high frequency of reviews. 
 
To study how the Yelp targeting algorithm would affect the deployment of 
inspection resources in King County, we merge census information from the American 
Community Survey with our Yelp and inspection data. Figure 7 plots the proportion of 
Asians and median income levels across census tracts. From Figure 1, population density 
is highest in the Seattle area. Asians tend to live in the southern and eastern portions of 
 
database. Our match is almost surely correct, given that the website refers to “Von’s Gustobistro 1000 
Spirits.” See 100 Years, 1,000 Spirits, VON’S GUSTOBISTRO, http://www.vons1000spirits.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/6N2N-CJ53] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
126. This figure is based on all establishments subject to an inspection during Kang’s 
observation period from 2006–2013. 
127. Sadilek et al., supra note 84, at 3984. 
128. See Alan Mislove et al., Understanding the Demographics of Twitter Users, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL AAAI CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA 554, 557 
(AAI Press 2011), http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/amislove/publications/Twitter-ICWSM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/69FP-VXG2] (“Twitter users significantly overrepresent the densely populat[ed] 
regions of the U.S., are predominantly male, and represent a highly non-random sample of the overall 
race/ethnicity distribution.”). 
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the county, with significant geographic clustering. The northern and eastern portions of 
the county tend to be higher income. 
Figure 8 compares the restaurant distribution to the presence and depth of reviews 
on Yelp. The left panel plots the number of permitted establishments subject to 
inspections in King County. The middle panel plots the number of restaurants that 
could be matched from Yelp against King County data. Out of 11,500 permitted 
establishments, only around 6000 could be reliably matched. High schools, cafeterias, 
and nursing homes, for instance, are generally not reviewed on Yelp, but are subject to 
health inspections. The right panel displays the penetration by the number of Yelp 
reviews per establishment identified on Yelp. We observe a dramatic shift toward 
central and north Seattle to the detriment of the rest of King county. Targeting 
inspections based on such reviews would hence shift enforcement resources 
considerably across the county, undercutting the premise of joint city-county health 
agency. 
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Figure 7: King County Demographics. The left panel plots the percentage of the population that 
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Figure 8: Yelp Penetration in King County. The panels compare all permitted establishments on 
the left panel to establishments matched on Yelp in the middle panel to the distribution of reviews 
(conditional on a match) in the right panel. This figure shows that targeting based on Yelp reviews 
would overwhelmingly focus inspection resources on central and north Seattle to the detriment 
of the rest of King County. 
 
What equity implications would this shift have? Figure 9 shows how the 
penetration of Yelp reviews (on the y-axis) varies with demographic characteristics. Yelp 
reviews are far less prevalent in areas with high Asian, Hispanic, and limited English-
speaking populations, and far more prevalent in areas that are disproportionately white. 
 
 
Figure 9: Correlates of Yelp review penetration. Each panel presents demographic attributes from 
the American Community Survey, with dots representing census tracts, weighted by the number 
of establishments. The y-axis represents the number of reviews per restaurant. The International 
District is an area with a high number of ethnic restaurants that is frequently visited by tourists. 
 
To formally test this, we conduct simple regression tests (presented in the 
Appendix, Table 3). The Table confirms that Yelp presence and number of reviews are 
highly (and statistically significantly) correlated with demographic covariates. The 
presence of an establishment on Yelp and the number of reviews, for instance, are each 
negatively associated with the proportion of the population that is Asian, foreign born, 
and has only a high school education. A 10% increase in the Asian population is 
associated with a decrease in five to twelve reviews per establishment. These results 
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corroborate extant evidence that governmental use of online platforms can exacerbate 
the digital divide.129 
3. Food Science vs. Food Perceptions. Targeting proposals cannot easily 
overcome the fundamental difficulties with detecting and investigating foodborne 
illnesses.130 Outbreaks with unknown food or etiology comprise the majority of 
reported outbreaks.131 Symptoms often manifest themselves after two days, but a 
common public misconception is that illness is caused by the last place one ate.132 
Relying on freeform, online speculation may exacerbate these problems. Sadilek’s 
study, for instance, exclusively identifies whether a tweet indicated a stomachache 
(regardless of whether foodborne at all) five days after posting a tweet within fifty 
meters of an establishment.133 But the incubation period for common foodborne 
illnesses (e.g., campylobacteriosis or listeriosis) can be up to several days.134 By failing 
to verify whether reporting is consistent with foodborne illness, the algorithm skips over 
a critical step of the intake process, thus making the prediction subject to a high degree 
of error. 
New York’s Yelp study is exemplary in its attempt to seriously vet the basis for 
complaints. But the effort of reviewing nearly 900 reviews and attempting to interview 
individuals resulted in only three suspected foodborne illnesses. The absence of any lab 
confirmation or identification of a pathogen made this information much less useful 
from a public health perspective. As seen in Figure 6, reviews are very sparse over time 
for the vast majority of establishments. This sparseness makes it nearly impossible for 
 
129. Of course, while social media skew in one direction, administrative data might skew in 
another. Garbage complaints and burglary complaints, as used by Chicago, for instance, might actually 
result in greater deployment of resources toward poorer neighborhoods. None of this is to say that the 
addition of such information cannot be helpful, but government agencies must be mindful of the trade-
offs involved. In other contexts, weighting and post-stratification may be a plausible way to adjust for 
sampling bias. YouGov, for instance, conducts post-stratification to estimate nationally representative 
parameters. See Panel Methodology, YOUGOV UK, https://yougov.co.uk/about/panel-methodology/ 
[https://perma.cc/NE29-XQVC] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). Here, however, the absence of any 
reviews for large numbers of restaurants makes such an adjustment infeasible. 
130. See Clare Leschin-Hoar, Outbreaks of Foodborne Illness Are Becoming Harder to Detect,  
SCI. AM. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/food-poisoning-outbreaks-
become-harder-to-detect/ [https://perma.cc/UY3T-4SCF] (noting how the increase in non-culture 
tests prevents DNA fingerprinting of pathogens and source tracing). 
131. See Caroline Smith DeWaal, Underreporting of Foodborne Illness: Strategies to Increase 




132. See Foodborne Disease: Frequently Asked Questions, VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://
www.vdh.virginia.gov/EnvironmentalHealth/FOOD/FoodSafety/FAQ/ [https://perma.cc/L8NT-
D4ZD] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (“A common misconception is that gastrointestinal illness was 
caused by the last food item that was eaten before symptoms started.”). 
133. See Sadilek et al., supra note 84, at 3984. 
134. Foodborne Illnesses: What You Need to Know, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN  
SERVS., FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm103263.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TNN6-29XW] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
Final to Printer_Ho (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  2:19 PM 
2017] EQUITY IN THE BUREAUCRACY 431 
such information to be reliably used as a real-time monitoring device of foodborne 
illness. 
Overcoming inaccurate public health perceptions is a common challenge for food 
safety, but social media reporting systems may exacerbate the distortion from such 
misperceptions. 
4. Normative Desirability. The notion that algorithmically driven governance can 
sidestep normative and equity concerns is illusory. As we know from Part I, inspectors 
differ dramatically in stringency. Both Kang’s algorithm and the Chicago Cross-Agency 
Data Project naively rely on inspection history to forecast violations.135 This means that 
the algorithm may simply be predicting whether a tough inspector is inspecting the area. 
Perversely, the algorithm may hence shift enforcement resources precisely into the wrong 
area, namely one where inspectors are already stringently inspecting establishments.136 
Algorithmic allocation may hence be entirely circular: a tough inspector cites more 
violations, and therefore we should inspect more stringently. But the real public health 
problem and challenge of institutional design may be exactly the reverse. The greater 
concern may be about violations that are not scored because of the lenience of 
inspectors. 
Similarly, it is not obvious whether information from social media should serve as 
a complement or as a substitute for enforcement resources. Implicitly, targeting 
algorithms assume the former. But if social media already disclose a suspected risk 
(publicly shaming an establishment into taking remedial measures), perhaps inspection 
resources should be deployed precisely where social media disclosures fail to function 
as a complement to conventional regulation. Concretely, if social media provide more 
information about food safety in central and northern Seattle, perhaps we should target 
inspection where there is an underprovision of food-safety information (i.e., the rest of 
King County). Understanding the direct effects of social media on establishment and 
consumer practices is a critical step in ascertaining whether, as a normative matter, such 
information should act as a complement or substitute for regulatory enforcement. 
5. Opportunity Costs. The costs to large-scale predictive data analytics can be 
substantial. First, the direct engineering time can be nontrivial. Sadilek’s Twitter project 
consumed six months of computer engineering to build the system and interface.137 
New York’s Yelp system “required substantial resources; in addition to programming 
expertise, staff members were needed to read reviews, send emails, interview reviewers, 
and perform follow-up inspections.”138 Some twenty individuals were credited for 
developing the foodborne illness reporting system in Chicago.139 Higher quality systems 
 
135. Chicago, for instance, includes the identity of the inspector and Kang’s algorithm includes 
ZIP codes that form the basis of inspector area assignments. See Harris et al., supra note 93, at 683; 
Kang et al., supra note 55, tbl.1. 
136. Unlike in other contexts, objective outcome data are hard to come by, and laboratory-
confirmed foodborne illnesses are rare events that cannot easily be used to train an algorithm. 
137. See Sadilek et al., supra note 84. 
138. Harrison et al., supra note 99, at 445. 
139. See Foodborne Chicago, supra note 93. 
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(Chicago’s reporting system and New York’s Yelp system) required substantial human 
resources of food-safety professionals for their implementation. 
Second, if deployed on a large scale, such systems introduce perverse incentives. 
Competitors might have the incentive to strategically tweet or mention food poisoning 
in reviews.140 And restaurants could monitor Twitter and Yelp to anticipate when to 
expect an inspector, thereby undercutting the randomness of current, unannounced 
routine inspections. 
While costs (and the digital divide) might decrease over time,141 the core needs of 
health departments—and government agencies generally—may be met not so much by 
advanced machine learning algorithms as by basic information infrastructure internal to 
the agency. Information technology infrastructure is generally recognized to be weak in 
government agencies.142 As a McKinsey report found, “Although many cities, counties, 
states, and agencies have chief information or chief technology officers, they often lack 
data expertise lower in the organization.”143 King County, for instance, adopted 
computer tablets for food inspections, but failed to develop an adequate means for 
supervisors to review the data input by inspectors, making supervision and management 
more difficult. The opportunity cost of a public health nurse reading Yelp reviews may 
be time spent debriefing investigation results with frontline staff, a task that might 
ultimately produce better long-term consequences. After assessing Web 2.0 initiatives 
 
140. Strategic sabotage by competitors via social media and the Internet has been well 
documented. See, e.g., Mike Blumenthal, Fake Reviews Starting to Get Mainstream Media Attention, 
UNDERSTANDING GOOGLE MY BUS. & LOCAL SEARCH (Mar. 2, 2011), http://blumenthals.com/
blog/2011/03/02/fake-reviews-starting-to-get-mainstream-media-attention/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6QHE-NP8R]; Samuel Gibbs, Restaurant Owner Sues Google Over Maps Listing ‘Sabotage,’  
THE GUARDIAN ( July 8, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/08/restaurant-
owner-sues-google-over-maps-listing-sabotage [https://perma.cc/VV8H-CXBS]; Susanna Kim, 
Business Owners Suspect Sabotage Tactics from Competitors, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2011), http://
abcnews.go.com/Business/business-owners-suspect-sabotage-tactics-competitors/story?id= 
13674139 [https://perma.cc/QR26-2A76]; Kevin Poulsen, How Google Map Hackers Can Destroy a 
Business At Will, WIRED ( July 7, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/hacking-google-maps/ 
[https://perma.cc/T73X-RSYN] (“Beneath its slick interface and crystal clear GPS-enabled vision of 
the world, Google Maps roils with local rivalries, score-setting, and deception.”). 
141. For instance, the argument may be (a) by sharing code for nEmesis, the development costs 
should reduce over time for other counties adopting the system, and (b) demographic disparities on 
Twitter will decline over time, making the sample increasingly representative. There are reasons to 
doubt this. First, the code still has to be adopted to the jurisdiction at hand, and local health departments 
have very limited computer programming capacity. Second, users shift rapidly across social media 
platforms (Friendster, MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, Yik Yak), making it likely that investments into 
these tools will have short lifespans. 
142. See U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-290, HIGH-RISK SERIES:  
AN UPDATE 37 (2015); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-346, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY: FDA NEEDS TO FULLY IMPLEMENT KEY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO LESSEN 
MODERNIZATION RISKS 14 (2012); Stuart Shapiro & Cary Coglianese, First Generation E-Rulemaking: 
An Assessment of Regulatory Agency Websites, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON DIGITAL GOVERNMENT RESEARCH: BRIDGING DISCIPLINES AND DOMAINS 19–
25 (2007) (finding wide variation in the quality of government agency websites). 
143. Michael Chui, Diana Farrell & Kate Jackson, How Government Can Promote Open Data and 
Help Unleash Over $3 Trillion in Economic Value, INNOVATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: OPEN 
DATA AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 4, 15 (McKinsey & Co. 2014). 
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by Los Angeles County, Raoul Freeman and Peter Loo concluded, “While these 
technologies promise enhanced user experiences and civic participation, their 
implementation must be considered with policy and organizational implications. Often, 
additional resources are required to ensure that these technologies are effectively 
implemented and that their benefits are fully realized.”144 
While it may grab headlines and be politically salable to invest in highly technical 
projects, these analytical resources might be better deployed to help the department 
manage, learn, and evaluate based on existing data.145 
* * * * 
None of this is to say that this kind of local experimentation is not worth it. It 
absolutely is, and we applaud health departments for their entrepreneurialism. But given 
the concerns identified above, agencies should not let such attempts crowd out first-
order concerns with public health enforcement. After all, Boston’s remedy for the “rich 
bias” of Street Bump 1.0146—namely, to send city inspectors out with the iPhone app—
itself required an effective and equitable inspection system. 
III. DISCLOSURE 
Can disclosure improve food safety? For years, scholars have conceived of 
restaurant letter grading as the model for effectively engaging in information disclosure. 
By providing a simplified signal at the time relevant to consumer decision-making, 
scholars posit that letter grading overcomes the deficiencies of information overload. 
David Weil and coauthors, for instance, conclude from a synthetic review of a wide 
range of information disclosure regimes that letter grading is one of the few “highly 
effective” forms of disclosure.147 Grade disclosures and perceptions of food safety 
certainly seem to affect consumer decisions.148 In earlier work, however, I showed that 
the frontline differences in inspection styles undercut the informational basis for 
grading.149 In New York, scores from one routine, unannounced inspection have 
virtually no predictive power over scores down the road.150 The long-standing public 
 
144. Raoul J. Freeman & Peter Loo, Web 2.0 and E-Government at the Municipal Level, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 2009 WORLD CONGRESS ON PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND TRUST AND 
THE MANAGEMENT OF E-BUSINESS 70 (2009). 
145. As another illustration, Stanford Law School has been engaged in dozens of policy 
practicums where a government agency or nonprofit organization is the client, with Stanford faculty 
and students providing research resources (often quantitatively driven) to help the organization learn 
from data. 
146. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, 
PRESERVING VALUES 51–52 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8CC-XBX6]. 
147. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 22, at 82–83. 
148. See Jee Hye Lee, Johye Hwang & Azlin Mustapha, Popular Ethnic Foods in the United States: 
A Historical and Safety Perspective, 13 COMPREHENSIVE REV. FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 2, 11 (2014); 
Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant 
Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q. J. ECON. 409 (2003). 
149. See Ho, supra note 17. 
150. Id. at 4–45. 
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health critique of letter grading—which originally stemmed from the New Deal—is that 
restaurant inspections are merely a “snapshot-in-time,” with inspectors, food-safety 
practices, and conditions in continual flux.151 
A. Unadjusted Grading 
Nearly all jurisdictions engaging in letter grading determine the grade on the basis 
of a single routine inspection.152 The left panel of Figure 10 displays King County’s 
score distribution based on one inspection cycle. Over 50% of establishments receive 
zero red points, so a conventional grading system by construction could not draw 
distinctions among the top 50% of establishments. The distribution is also very skewed, 
with some establishments receiving very high point totals. The right panel displays the 
distribution across an area rotation, with each cell shaded based on the density of 
establishments. For instance, the lower left corner represents roughly 31% of 
establishments that receive zero red points in both time periods. Across area rotations 
and inspection cycles, however, the correlation is quite low. Using a simple least squares 
fit, a ten-point increase is associated with a roughly 2.4-point increase in the subsequent 
cycle (R2 = 0.04). 
 
 
Figure 10: Distribution of points for one inspection cycle in the left panel and across area rotations 
in the right panel. In the right panel, each cell is shaded by the density of establishments falling in 
that point combination, with the legend indicating the proportion of observations. Points are 
censored at sixty for visibility. Using only a single inspection cycle, over 50% of establishments 
receive zero red points. Findings are comparable in other years. While there is a statistically 
significant correlation (β = 0.24, SE = 0.02 from least squares regression), unexplained variation 
is quite high (R2 = 0.04). 
 
A superficially appealing grading system might assign A’s to restaurants scoring 
zero red points, B’s to restaurants scoring between zero to thirty-five red points, and 
C’s to any establishment scoring thirty-five or more red points (and hence subject to a 
return visit). We call this the “unadjusted” grading scheme, which closely approximates 
 
151. Id. at 50. 
152. Many grading systems do allow for reinspections to change a grade, but because these 
inspections are anticipated (typically within thirty days), they are unlikely to reflect a genuine assessment 
of food-safety practices. By default, the principal grading basis is a routine inspection in nearly all 
jurisdictions. 
Final to Printer_Ho (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  2:19 PM 
2017] EQUITY IN THE BUREAUCRACY 435 
how grading is practiced in other jurisdictions. Based on that system, at the end of 2015, 
roughly 50% of establishments would have earned A’s, 40% B’s, and 10% C’s. Figure 
11 displays the geography of grades assigned on this system. The grades would suggest 
that there is substantial variability across regions in King County. At the end of 2015, 
for instance, Redmond would receive nearly 20% C’s. The International District, which 




Figure 11: Geography of naïve grading system applied to King County at the end of 2015. Each 
establishment is assigned a grade based on a single routine inspection, with zero red points 
corresponding to an A grade, red points between zero and thirty-five points corresponding to a 
B grade, and thirty-five or more points corresponding to a C grade. The left panel displays the 
proportion of A establishments in a ZIP code, with darker shading corresponding to more A’s. 
The right panel plots the proportion of C’s in a ZIP code, with darker shades of red indicating 
more C’s. 
 
But these geographic differences are unlikely to accurately represent genuine 
geographic differences in food risk. For instance, Figure 12 shows that inspectors largely 
anchor around the same mean before and after an area rotation. To understand the 
substantive impact of such inspector differences on grading, we conducted a simulation 
exercise, estimating a model that accounts for establishment, month, and inspector fixed 
effects.153 Based on this model, we can counterfactually predict how the assigned grades 
 
153. See Ho, supra note 17. 
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might change if a single inspector had conducted all inspections across the county. 
Moving from the tenth to the ninetieth percentile inspector, a lenient inspector would 
assign 55% of establishment A’s, while a tough inspector would assign 2.5% A’s. 
Because inspectors are assigned principally by ZIP code, these geographic differences 




Figure 12: Persistence of inspector differences across area rotations. Each dot represents an 
inspector who actively inspected both before and after the area rotation in January 2014, with 
dots weighted by the minimum number of inspections in either the pre or post period. Based on 
a simple linear fit, a one-point increase in the pre-area rotation mean is associated with a one-
point increase after the post-area rotation mean (R2 = 0.65). 
 
In addition, grading cutoffs themselves can change inspection behavior. The 
difference between no red points and some red points is one that is already subject to 
considerable variability across inspectors. The additional pressure for operators to want 
to earn an A can lead some inspectors to use their discretion to not cite a violation. 
Indeed, this is what appears to have happened in the vast majority of grading 
jurisdictions. In San Diego, for instance, there is a sharp discontinuity around the ninety-
point threshold for an A grade, with 99.9% of establishments earning A’s.154 As one San 
Diego inspector noted, “Some inspectors will give out a B for an eighty-nine. I usually 
warn somebody at that point. It’s a judgment call.”155 
Similarly, while the thirty-five-point threshold for a C grade appears consistent 
with the food code (and accounts for the fact that some inspectors do not tally all 
violations once it becomes clear that a return visit is required), some inspectors would 
like to avoid the additional workload of a return visit. By introducing additional tension 
 
154. See Ho, supra note 23, at 611. 
155. Ed Sylvester, Making Sure Your Eating Places Are A-OK: Inspectors Rate  
S.D. Restaurants, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1980, at A1, A3. 
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with an operator over the line between a B and C grade, the thirty-five-point threshold 
may further disincentivize inspectors from engaging in return visits that are arguably the 
most important from a public health perspective. 
In short, unadjusted grading presents serious flaws. 
B. Equitable Grading 
In collaboration with King County, we sought to design a better grading system. 
The principal criteria were that a grading system should (a) draw meaningful distinctions 
in terms of food risk among restaurants deemed safe enough to open by the county (i.e., 
with fewer than ninety red points), and (b) be easily explained to the public and to 
operators. Criterion (b) ruled out a range of sophisticated statistical adjustments (e.g., 
item response theory). After several meetings with stakeholders, which presented 
grading systems in other jurisdictions, several other recommendations followed. First, 
to counteract the conventional critique of inspections as presenting merely snapshots-
in-time, stakeholders articulated the desire to have a grade based on more than just a 
single inspection.156 Second, the political compromise in many jurisdictions was to 
introduce an additional reinspection for grade resolution with the grading system.157 In 
New York, adjudicative appeals for grade resolution also skyrocketed.158 Rates of 
appeal, particularly with attorney representation, are likely to exacerbate demographic 
differences across restaurateurs.159 Because the evidence shows that grade reinspections 
tend to draw resources away from the highest health risks, the county ruled out regrading 
based on reinspections.160 Third, the county rightly focused on the first-order challenge 
of improving the accuracy and consistency of the inspection process.161 Our 
randomized controlled trial revealed that peer review increased violations cited and 
scored by roughly 17–19% and increased consistency between inspectors.162 As a result, 
the county generalized the peer review program to the entire staff beginning in 
September 2015.163 While peer review is very promising, it is also a continuing process, 
as inconsistencies and disagreements about the health code can only gradually be 
resolved. 
With these criteria in mind, we aimed to place the grading system on a better 
evidence basis using historical inspection data. 
 




157. See Ho, supra note 23, at 650. 
158. Id. at 647. 
159. See Chao, supra note 16 (“[M]any owners and operators in Chinatown, when confronted 
by fines or settlements in the mail, paid them without question. They also tended to show up at the 
tribunals by themselves, with no lawyer, and without any documents in hand.”). 
160. See, e.g., Restaurant Reporting Subcommittee Meeting Notes, supra note 156. 
161. See, e.g., id. 
162. See Ho, supra note 17, at 8. 
163. See id. at 71. 
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First, the peer review inspections allowed us to identify violations that were the 
most inconsistently applied across frontline inspectors. Figure 13 plots the baseline 
citation rate and the deviation rate for individual citations from 378 peer inspections 
conducted from January–April 2015. The deviation rate represents how frequently two 
inspectors observing identical conditions on the ground disagreed on whether to cite a 
specific violation. Each dot represents one type of violation, with red and blue dots 
corresponding to red and blue violations respectively. The bands represent simply linear 
fits, with 95% confidence intervals. What becomes apparent from peer review 
inspections is that blue violations are much more inconsistently applied. This finding 
makes substantive sense, as state training, marking instructions, and county trainings 
focus disproportionately on red (critical) violations. Coupled with the fact that red 
violations are also the ones that pose higher health risks, we concluded that in contrast 
to other jurisdictions, which overwhelmingly include minor violations as the basis for 
grading, King County’s grading system should be based on red violations.164 
 
 
Figure 13: Peer review evidence of deviations. Each dot represents one of fifty-two violations, 
with colors corresponding to red (critical) and blue (noncritical) violations. The x-axis represents 
the baseline rate at which violations are cited, and the deviation rate indicates the rate at which 
two inspectors observing the same conditions disagreed on whether or not to cite that violation. 
This evidence shows that blue violations, which receive relatively little training, are much more 
inconsistently cited. 
 
Second, to develop a sense of how many inspections cycles to use, we studied the 
predictive power of past inspection scores and found that the predictive validity drops 
off considerably beyond five inspections. We hence illustrate an adjusted grading system 
based on the average of up to four routine inspections. 
 
164. One alternative would be to conduct inverse weighting based on the deviation rate, but 
this would both change over time and be more difficult to explain. 
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Third, we studied area rotations and differences in inspection styles, concluding 
that rotations had only minor effects on scoring behavior of inspectors (see Figure 12). 
To illustrate, Figure 14 plots performance of the same establishments operating in 
Redmond before and after the area rotation in January 2014. The left panel plots red 
points assigned by a lenient inspector on the x-axis compared to red points assigned by 
more stringent inspectors on the y-axis after the area rotation. In 2013, nearly 80% of 
establishments were assigned zero red points, but many of those establishments fared 
much worse after the area rotation, with only 34% scoring zero red points. 
The middle panel plots the distribution of scores for establishments, averaged 
across four routine inspections, before the area rotation. The dashed vertical lines 
represent unadjusted grading system cutoffs, uniformly imposed across the county. 
What unadjusted cutoffs miss is that earning twelve red points from a lenient inspector 
places the establishment in the bottom 10% of restaurants in that ZIP code. Unadjusted 
grading would hence result in a false negative. The right panel presents the distribution 
of average scores after the area rotation. For the tougher inspectors, twelve red points 
actually place the establishment in the top half of establishments. Unadjusted grading 
would hence result in a false positive. 
To reduce such error, we thus studied an adjustment based on relative ZIP code 
performance. We kept the overall proportion of A’s, B’s, and C’s the same as in the 
unadjusted system (50%, 40%, and 10%, respectively when conducting grading at the 
end of 2015), but identify the identical percentile cutoffs within each ZIP code. This has 
two major advantages. Because inspectors are assigned principally based on ZIP codes, 
this system adjusts for differences in inspection styles.165 In addition, because most food 
choices are local, the relative performance is more meaningful for (a) consumers 
choosing where to eat, and (b) providing establishments with incentives to improve. 
The system is also easy to explain. Grades represent the relative performance in an area 
for up to four routine inspections. The colors on the bars in the middle and right panels 
of Figure 14 represent the adjusted grades, with green, orange, and red corresponding 
to A’s, B’s, and C’s, respectively.166 These demonstrate how, for Redmond, it is possible 
to use the information generated under widely heterogeneous inspections styles to 
meaningfully identify differences among establishments. 
 
 
165. Two practical complications arise here. First, some ZIP codes are sufficiently large that 
they share multiple inspectors. Second, inspectors can be assigned to multiple ZIP codes, not all of 
which are geographically contiguous. We hence studied a fuller adjustment, identifying percentile 
cutoffs in each unique inspector area. The ZIP code adjustment appeared to perform close to this ideal 
adjustment, but the ideal adjustment has the downside of being harder to explain, as unique inspector 
areas do not correspond with otherwise recognizable areas. While area rotations also present a transition 
issue, the facts that the grade is based on up to the last four routines and that new inspectors take over 
the whole area tend to mitigate this transition cost. 
166. We also proposed a “D” category of high health hazards, based on multiple return 
inspections or a recent closure. This category has the virtue of minimizing false positives, and providing 
an inspector with additional leverage to induce corrective action, when one return visit was insufficient. 
Because this category is constant across the adjusted and unadjusted schemes, we do not focus on it 
here. 
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Figure 14: Effect of area rotation in Redmond. The left panel plots red points assigned during a 
single inspection round on the x-axis for 2013, when the area was primarily inspected by a lenient 
inspector, and on the y-axis for 2015, when the area was assigned by several tough inspectors. The 
middle panel plots the average red points for four routines pre-area rotation. The dashed vertical 
lines represent grade cutoffs for unadjusted grading, leading to 80% of establishments earning 
A’s. The colors represent grade assignments for the adjusted system (green for A, orange for B, 
and red for C), leading to 56% of establishments earning A’s. The right panel plots the same 
establishments after the area rotation. Unadjusted grading would lead to 34% of establishments 
earning A’s, but this is because tough inspectors are now assigned to the area. Adjusted grading 
leads to 49% of establishments earning A’s. 
 
Figure 15 displays the geography of A grades before and after the area rotation in 
rows and for the unadjusted and adjusted grading systems in columns. In the left 
column, Redmond goes from appearing to be a top performer to a bottom performer 
across area rotations. But this is entirely an artifact of inspector rotation. The right panels 
show how the adjusted grading system smoothens out these artificial geographic 
differences. 
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Figure 15: Adjusted and unadjusted grades across area rotations. The top row plots the proportion 
of A grades in a ZIP code based on inspection results from before the area rotation in January 
2014, as if King County restaurants had been graded on December 31, 2013. The bottom row 
plots the proportion of A grades in a ZIP code based primarily on inspection results from after 
the rotation, as if King County restaurants had been graded on December 31, 2015. The left 
column plots unadjusted grades, based on a single routine inspection. The right panel plots grades 
based on an average of up to four routine inspections (some restaurants do not have results for 
as many as four inspections), based on percentile cutoffs within each ZIP code. Each colored ZIP 
code has at least ten restaurants. 
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  Unadjusted Adjusted 
    Points   A’s  B’s  C’s A’s B’s C’s 
Overall (2013) 8.47 0.56 0.38 0.07 0.56 0.38 0.06 
Overall (2015) 11.25 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.50 0.40 0.10 
Redmond (2013) 4.08 0.78 0.19 0.03 0.56 0.38 0.06 
Redmond (2015) 19.61 0.34 0.45 0.21 0.49 0.41 0.11 
Bellevue A (2013) 10.94 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.54 0.40 0.06 
Bellevue A (2015) 4.04 0.85 0.11 0.04 0.53 0.36 0.11 
Bellevue B 16.66 0.36 0.46 0.18 0.47 0.43 0.10 
International 
District 
11.75 0.53 0.36   0.11 0.50 0.40 0.10 
Rainier Valley 15.43 0.47 0.35 0.19 0.50 0.40 0.11 
Asian 19.06 0.32 0.46 0.21 0.25 0.51 0.24 
Table 1: Effect of adjustment for different subsets of establishments. Redmond (2013) and 
Redmond (2015) represent the same area before and after an area rotation (with simulated grading 
occurring on December 31, 2013 and December 31, 2015). The lenient inspector assigned to 
Redmond in 2013 moved to Bellevue A in 2014. Bellevue A represents ZIP 98008 and Bellevue 
B represents ZIP 98004, showing that there are considerable differences in the same city (results 
for Bellevue B, the International District, Rainier Valley and for Asian establishments are based 
grades calculated at the end of 2015). The bottom row presents estimates for Asian establishments 
(based on the subset that could be merged with Yelp cuisine categories): the adjusted grading 
system underscores that Asian establishments systematically underperform relative to other 
establishments in the same area. 
 
Table 1 displays the breakdown of grades for a sample of areas. The first row 
shows that overall, the proportions of grades are held constant across the county as a 
whole. The third and sixth rows show how the movement of the lenient inspector from 
Redmond to Bellevue A (one ZIP code in Bellevue) leads (a) Redmond to appear to 
drop markedly in performance, and (b) Bellevue A to appear to improve markedly in 
performance. Horizontal inequity emerges in 2015 as well, as another ZIP code in 
Bellevue (Bellevue B) appears to perform much more poorly in the unadjusted system. 
In other words, inequities arise both inter-temporally for the same area and 
contemporaneously across neighboring areas. Adjusted grades moderate all of these 
differences, which are attributable primarily to differences in inspection styles. Indeed, 
using the same counterfactual grade simulation as above, the grade distribution is by 
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construction robust to whether a tough or lenient inspector was to inspect all King 
County restaurants. While moving from the tenth to ninetieth percentile inspector 
would change the grade for over half of establishments in the unadjusted system, 
inspector toughness has no effect on simulated grades in the adjusted system. 
 
 
Figure 16: Illustration of how adjusted grade improves information content of grades. The left 
column represents raw scores across area rotations. The top and middle rows represent 
establishments assigned to tough and lenient inspectors after January 1, 2014, respectively. The 
bottom row represents all establishments. The right two columns depict how unadjusted and 
adjusted grading classifies establishments across area rotations, with dots proportional to the 
number of establishments. For instance, the largest dot in the top middle panel indicates that the 
modal category is establishments receiving an A under the prior inspector and B’s after the 
assignment to a tough inspector. Lines represent least squares fits, with regression coefficients 
(β) and coefficients of determination (R2) presented as summary measures of predictive validity. 
In all instances, adjusted grades improve the predictive power of grades. 
 
Last, by making the measurement of food risk more accurate, the adjusted system 
increases predictive power over future performance. The left column of panels in Figure 
16 presents the correlation of point performance over area rotation. The middle column 
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presents the classifications into grades in the unadjusted system and the right column 
presents classifications based on the adjusted system. The top row illustrates how even 
when a tough inspector takes over an area, the adjustment can improve predictive 
validity. The top middle panel shows that establishments previously assigned A’s in the 
unadjusted system have a higher probability of earning a B or C with the tough 
inspector. The adjustment in the top right panel reverses this: an A with the prior 
inspector has the highest probability of earning an A under the new inspector. The lines 
represent simple linear measures of association, and in all instances, the slope of the line 
(characterizing predictive validity) increases with the adjusted grade, indicating that the 
adjusted grading power has better predictive validity than unadjusted grading.167 
While adjusted grades are more consistent across time and geography, equity 
implications along demographic variables and cuisine types are more complex. Our 
initial hypothesis had been that due to geographic clustering (e.g., with far more Asian 
restaurants located in the International District), the adjusted grading system might 
improve the grade performance of Asian establishments. If anything, the adjusted 
grading system decreases the proportion of Asian restaurants earning A’s by roughly 
7%, as seen in Table 1. To understand the intuition behind this, in nearly every ZIP 
code, Asian establishments perform relatively worse compared to non-Asian 
counterparts. By introducing more noise due to differences in inspection styles, the 
unadjusted grading system attenuates the Asian-grade relationship. With a more 
accurate, adjusted grading system, it becomes clearer that Asian restaurants 
systematically are performing worse in inspections across all inspectors, a result consistent 
with evidence from other jurisdictions.168 On the other hand, Table 1 also shows that 
for Rainier Valley, one of King County’s most diverse and poorest neighborhoods, the 
adjusted grading system decreases the proportion of C’s by roughly 8%. Because 
geographic mobility is likely lower in poorer neighborhoods, this shows one of the 
possible equity benefits of designing a locally meaningful grading system. Yet because 
the grading system is intended to protect the public, higher grades in a neighborhood 
are not necessarily better per se for that community. 
While this research demonstrated ways to place grading on a better evidence basis, 
there remains substantial unexplained variability in inspection performance. Grading 
can be improved, but public health benefits remain nonobvious. Our policy analysis 
also challenges open-ended invocations of “equity.” King County, for instance, appears 
to recognize inequity along “race, ethnicity, income, immigration status and ZIP code.”169 
While the adjusted grading system is certainly more predictive of future inspection 
 
167. We use linear fits for simplicity, but obtain comparable results using measures of 
association for categorical variables. 
168. See Joe Satran, New York Restaurant Health Grades Vary by Cuisine, HUFFINGTON POST 
(last updated June 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/11/new-york-restaurant-
health-grades_n_3392571.html [https://perma.cc/ZR52-SYQ6] (noting that the ten worst performing 
cuisines in New York were Japanese, Soul Food, African, Latin American, Chinese, Korean, Indian, 
Creole, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi); Chao, supra note 16 (“Chinatown Business Improvement District 
(BID) announced that the community has 20% fewer restaurant A ratings than citywide.”). 
169. KING CTY. EXEC., supra note 15, at 1 (emphasis added). 
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performance and more equitable geographically (across ZIP codes), it also highlights 
the Asian cuisine food-safety gap. And just as with Chilangos, it is unclear how the 
department should weight equity concerns with respect to establishments or patrons. 
To borrow Judge Friendly’s phrase, equity is a “verbal coat of many colors.”170 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
These three case studies illustrate the pervasive challenges of rigorously evaluating 
the equity dimensions in regulatory enforcement. Addressing the disparity between the 
food inspection performances of Asian and non-Asian establishments in King County 
remains a major challenge, with little research pinpointing root causes.171 The difference 
may stem from underlying differences across cuisine types. Asian cuisines, for instance, 
may engage in more raw food preparation and raw butchering, activities that are either 
inherently riskier or have more difficulty conforming to the food code. Alternatively, 
the relative poverty level of certain immigrant communities may simply make it 
infeasible to upgrade the physical infrastructure (e.g., storage, food preparation area, or 
refrigeration) to comply fully with the health code. While our evidence cannot directly 
address these causes of the inspection disparity, our evidence does suggest several other 
affirmative policy interventions if other mechanisms are at stake. 
A. Peer Review and Data-Driven Training 
Lack of inspector knowledge about the food preparation process and historical 
tension between the food program and immigrant communities may contribute to the 
disparity, and agencies should confront such issues directly with training via peer review. 
 
 
170. See The Honorable Henry Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 763 
(1982). 
171. See Kimberly J. Harris et al., Food Safety Inspections Results: A Comparison of Ethnic-
Operated Restaurants to Non-Ethnic-Operated Restaurants, 46 INT’L J. OF HOSPITALITY MGMT. 190, 
197–98 (2015). 
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Figure 17: Baseline citation rate for a red violation on the x-axis against the odds ratio for an Asian 
establishment on the y-axis, with 95% confidence interval. The horizontal line represents identical 
citation rates across Asian and non-Asian establishments. 
 
While frontline inspectors may have divergent priors on whether a particular 
practice (e.g., cooling large vats of broth at room temperature) is acceptable, there is 
often a scientific answer based on food science, which can help to resolve 
disagreements. Evidence from our peer review experiment suggests that the process 
may be a supportive environment to develop common guidelines for the department. 
Figure 17 shows how simple analysis of historical inspection information might 
aid in this process, much in the same way that peer review information allowed us to 
design targeted training materials. The x-axis plots the baseline rate at which violations 
are cited, and the y-axis plots the odds ratio for Asian establishments, with a ratio above 
one indicating that Asian establishments are disproportionately cited for that violation. 
This simple analysis reveals that room temperature storage, raw meat storage, and 
cooling procedures are violations that are commonly cited but with very high odds ratios 
for Asian establishments. For instance, numerous inspectors mentioned substantial 
disagreement about cooling requirements for pho broth. One inspector noted that 
because the broth had been cooked for hours and would be reheated in the morning, 
cooling a big bucket should not pose a health risk. Other inspectors stated that such 
cooling procedures violated the health code and the broth was required to be discarded. 
Other commonly disputed code items involve rice noodles kept at room temperature, 
hanging roasted duck at room temperature, and the use of hot boxes (or cambros) to 
store food. Training materials addressing these violations and food items would help to 
(a) establish what the actual risks are to such practices, and (b) identify more feasible 
food preparation techniques. 
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Of course, not all issues have a clear answer in food science. It is undisputed that 
proper handwashing reduces food risk.172 Yet given potential cultural sensitivities, how 
should inspectors most effectively educate and persuade operators to engage in proper 
handwashing? When the physical infrastructure needs to be upgraded, inspectors might 
shut down an establishment, with a penalty fee, to force it to upgrade. But how should 
an inspector deal with an establishment when the penalty fee may put it out of business? 
How can inspectors determine whether the failure to remedy a violation is due to 
income constraints or defiance? And how can inspectors effectively educate operators 
who may have limited familiarity with the food code? Peer review may be one of the 
only mechanisms to allow inspectors to acquire these soft skills that are invaluable to 
resolve equity issues in food enforcement. 
B. Information Reporting and Information Disclosure 
Our research also has two concrete policy implications for the role of information. 
First, targeting based on social media as currently practiced has limited use, but 
efforts to broadly improve the reporting of foodborne illnesses can be beneficial.173 Big 
data cannot ignore principles of statistical inference and the normative basis for 
regulation.174 On the other hand, Chicago’s development of an online reporting system 
may present a worthwhile means of curing the fundamental issue of low reporting rates. 
Instead of investing in highly technical, gimmicky interventions, data scientists should 
invest resources to enable—rather than distract—agencies to conduct their core 
mission. 
Second, our study shows how to engage in more meaningful information 
disclosure. More accurate, consistent, and equitable grading systems can mitigate 
conventional criticisms of inspections as merely a snapshot-in-time, by leveraging 
inspection information over multiple cycles, by using peer review information to focus 
on high-risk and consistently implemented violations, and by adjusting for inter-
inspector differences. Any jurisdiction applying letter grading should place its system on 
a firmer evidence basis, using our research results. 
C. Language Access 
Language and cultural barriers appear substantial in the inspection system. From 




173. This does not rule out the possibility of more sophisticated targeting based on social media 
that adjusts, for instance, for sampling bias. 
174. See, e.g., David Lazer et al., The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in Big Data Analysis, 343  
SCI. 1203 (2014) (showing how failure to account for changing predictors invalidated Google Flu 
Trends). 
175. Chao, supra note 16. 
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Much may be done to improve language access to the regulatory system.176 First, 
agencies should continue to hire staff who are bilingual and, ideally, versed in different 
cultures around food.177 Such hiring, as exhibited by King County’s efforts, may not 
solve the problem of the ethnic gap in food-safety performance, but would permit a 
wider range of engagement between operators and inspectors. For instance, during a 
2015 salmonella outbreak, the public health nurse noticed that most of the infected 
individuals appeared to be of East African origin. An inspector fluent in Amharic 
conducted the subsequent interviews and convened a series of community meetings to 
contain the scope of the outbreak. 
Second, agencies may need to invest more resources into making the bureaucracy 
easier to navigate, including multilingual permitting processes178 and food-safety course 
materials,179 and in ways that are sensitive to a range of cuisines.180 For instance, lower 
perceived reporting rates of foodborne illness from immigrant communities181 may be 
 
176. Currently, King County has three language tiers, with mandatory translation only for 
Spanish. See Appendix C: Language Tiers, KING CTY., WASH. GOV., http://www.kingcounty.gov/~/
media/operations/policies/documents/inf142aeo_appxc_languagetiers_intro.ashx?la=en [https:// 
perma.cc/T65C-9A9T] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016). 
177. See Office for Civil Rights, Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding 
Title VI and the Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient 
Persons- Summary, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-
providers/laws-regulations-guidance/guidance-federal-financial-assistance-title-VI/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/4YZ5-6BZC] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
178. Online information about the permitting process in King County, for instance, is 
exclusively in English, although the site does note “[a]lternative formats [are] available upon request.” 
PUB. HEALTH SEATTLE & KING COUNTY, PLAN REVIEW AND PERMITTING GUIDELINES FOR  




179. For instance, New York’s “online food protection course is available only in English, 
Spanish, and Chinese.” Chao, supra note 16. There is some evidence that food-training programs are 
effective. See M. Martinez-Tome, A.M. Vera & M.A. Murcia, Improving the Control of Food Production 
in Catering Establishments with Particular Reference to the Safety of Salads, 11 FOOD CONTROL 437 
(2000); Denise Worsfold & Christopher J. Griffith, A Survey of Food Hygiene and Safety Training in  
the Retain and Catering Industry, 33 NUTRITION FOOD SCI. 68 (2003). 
180. See Po et al., supra note 16. 
181. King County officials suspect a sharp distinction among immigrant and nonimmigrant 
populations in reporting behavior. In their assessment, nonimmigrant populations appeared more likely 
to report milder symptoms (e.g., for norovirus). With outbreaks in 2014, however, large numbers of 
immigrants were reported as infected via hospital confirmations, with much more serious symptoms. 
Interviews in those communities suggested that vomiting, nausea, and diarrhea were deemed 
insufficient for reporting an illness and visiting a hospital, and that only dehydration and bloody stool 
led to a hospital visit. The reporting differential would be consistent with beliefs generally that 
immigrant populations have a lower reporting rate to law enforcement or are less likely to seek health 
care. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS & EDNA EREZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS 
AS VICTIMS: TOWARD A MULTICULTURAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998) (finding that 67% of 
officials believed that reporting rates were lower among immigrants); Erum Nadeem et al., Does Stigma 
Keep Poor Young Immigrant and U.S.-Born Black and Latina Women from Seeking Mental Health Care?, 
58 PSYCH. SERVS. 1547 (2007) (finding underutilization of mental health care by ethnic minority 
groups); Ilhong Yun & David Mueller, A Study of the Determinants of Reporting Crime to the Police 
Among Chinese Immigrants, 35 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 53, 55 (2011) (noting consensus 
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explained in part by the fact that the King County nurse by default conducts the phone 
intake process in English. An online reporting system could be translated into other 
languages, and non-English reports routed to inspectors with corresponding language 
skills, thereby taking fuller advantage of language capacities among staff. (Language 
access on social media platforms may similarly become important if agencies were to 
actually rely on such platforms to target enforcement resources.) 
Third, counties should consider translating inspection and violation comments 
into the languages used by the operators and their staff. This would be quite easy, for 
instance, for stock comments in the inspection tablet system in King County. Recall that 
the peer review process also revealed that one inspector attempted to simplify her 
comments to make them more accessible in light of the language barrier.182 Such 
simplifications, even if in English, may also help to promote broader access and 
understanding of food-safety principles. 
CONCLUSION 
King County’s equity initiative was a bold step. It led the food-safety program to 
offer workshops on equity issues for staff, to develop community engagement events, 
to distribute food worker manuals in a wider range of languages, and to increase cultural 
and linguistic diversity among inspectors. While these efforts are to be applauded, they 
nonetheless fall short of identifying a “system[ ] to engage and empower all county 
employees to advance equity through their daily work.”183 
This Essay has demonstrated how conducting collaborative research with 
academics, conducting a randomized controlled trial, and augmenting county data with 
census and social media information can clarify equity dimensions and identify potential 
solutions. Prior to this research, actual policy analyses conducted under the equity 
initiative remained quite limited.184 The food-safety program had many intuitions about 
equity dimensions, but little clarity as to scope and fact. Our results underscore that 
while inspectors grapple with equity issues in varying ways, there remains a considerable 
gap in performance across Asian and non-Asian restaurants. Peer review may be a 
critical tool for inspection staff to bridge differences in enforcement and to develop a 
broader skillset to cure the ethnic cuisine gap. We have also shown that targeting via 
social media would distort enforcement in highly undesirable ways, and that restaurant 
letter grading can be improved to reduce unjustifiable differences. Such research can 
give content and meaning to otherwise diffuse notions of “equity.” 
More generally, equity interventions should themselves be placed on a firmer 
evidence base. Do staff workshops on equity issues (e.g., implicit bias training) actually 
affect awareness and work conduct? Outside the food program, King County also 
 
of immigrant underreporting). 
182. Ho, supra note 17. 
183. KING CTY. EXEC., supra note 15. 
184. See Equity & Soc. Just.: Tools and Resources, KING CTY., WASH. GOV., http://
www.kingcounty.gov/elected/executive/equity-social-justice/tools-resources.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/4L8F-5XV6] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
Final to Printer_Ho (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2017  2:19 PM 
450 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:401 
proposed numerous interventions under the equity initiative, such as universal access to 
developmental screenings for young children, mentoring and job-training programs for 
youth, and artistic programs as alternatives to juvenile detention.185 Yet to invest 
resources wisely, these programs should be rigorously evaluated, as the peer review 
program was. There is a long and well-established tradition of designing such 
interventions with evaluations in mind. 


































185. See KING CTY. EXEC., KING CTY. EQUITY & SOC. JUST. REP. 11, 16 (2015). 
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Appendix: Tables 
 
  National Yelp Twitter 
Age 18-34 0.23 0.43*** 0.49*** 
 35-54 0.28 0.35*** 0.31 
 55+ 0.25 0.21** 0.07*** 
Education No college 0.43 0.27*** 0.12*** 
 College 0.45 0.59*** 0.53* 
 Graduate 0.11 0.14** 0.33*** 
Income $0-59k 0.58 0.36*** 0.31*** 
 $60-99k 0.21 0.27*** 0.34*** 
 $100k+ 0.21 0.37*** 0.13*** 
Race White 0.64 0.68** 0.55** 
 Black 0.13 0.09*** 0.22*** 
 Hispanic 0.16 0.12*** 0.15 
Table 2: Demographic differences between the U.S. population and Yelp and Twitter users. Due 
to data availability constraints, income brackets used for the Twitter data are distinct from the 
brackets in the columns, and are as follows: $0-50k; $50-100k; $100k+. All reported income data 
refer to household income. Tests of significance were performed on the difference between Yelp/
Twitter sample proportions and the National proportions given in the first column. */**/*** 
denote statistical significance at α-levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.186 
 
186.  See comScore Media Metrix Description of Methodology: Unified Digital Measurement™ 
(Nov. 2013), COMSCORE, http://www.journalism.org/files/2014/03/comScore-Media-Metrix-
Description-of-Methodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7U8-FW7A] (estimating demographics from  
a user base of roughly two million internet users with computer tracking software); Yelp.com 
Demographics, QUANTCAST, https://www.quantcast.com/yelp.com#/demographicsCard [https:// 
perma.cc/3H3U-ZQ2R] (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (using Yelp viewer data from the past thirty days  
to provide race statistics for Yelp); Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Single Year of Age 
and Sex for the United States: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ( Jul. 1, 2015),  
https://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/asrh/2015/files/NC-EST2015-AGESEX-RES.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8NGF-H56P] (providing national age statistics); Educational Attainment: Five  
Key Data Releases from the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 24, 2012), https://
www.census.gov/newsroom/cspan/educ/educ_attain_slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN4N-4PEK] 
(providing national education statistics); Income Distribution to $250,000 or More for Households,  
U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (2012), http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-
poverty/cps-hinc/hinc-06.2011.html [https://perma.cc/6CKE-5ED8] (providing national income 
distribution numbers to serve as the basis for national income statistics); QuickFacts United States: Race 
and Hispanic Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/RHI125215/
00 [https://perma.cc/A9R5-QUN5] (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (providing national race statistics); Tom 
Webster, The Social Habit II: The Edison Research/Arbitron Internet and Multimedia Study 2011, 
EDISON RESEARCH (May 29, 2011), http://www.slideshare.net/webby2001/the-social-habit-
2011-by-edison-research [https://perma.cc/Q5J3-W6F8] (providing age and racial statistics for 
Twitter from a 2011 national random sample of 2020 interviews conducted with U.S. adults aged twelve 
and over); Tom Webster, Twitter Usage in America: 2010 The Edison Research/Arbitron Internet and 
Multimedia Study, EDISON RESEARCH, (April 29, 2010) http://www.onecommunity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/Twitter_Usage_In_America_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3NV-
ZLWD] (providing education and income data came from a 2010 report on Twitter usage statistics, 
using a nationally representative survey of 1753 Americans aged twelve and over); A Simple Guide to 
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Presence Reviews 












































Table 3: Correlates with presence on Yelp and Reviews per restaurant. Each cell represents a 
coefficient from a separate linear regression with the dependent variables of (1) the number of 
restaurants identified on Yelp divided by the number of permitted food establishments in the 
census tract (Presence), and (2) the number of Yelp reviews per restaurant identified on Yelp in 
the census tract (Reviews). “Prop.” indicates that the variable is a proportion. */**/*** denote 











Showcasing Your Business Online, YELP, http://static1.squarespace.com/static/50e0f895e4b002 
20dc7dcfd8/t/5656bdf9e4b06b23bf13ddbf/1448525305143/yelp-advertising-ebook.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/U3VT-P9GK] (providing age, education, and income statistics on Yelp users). 
